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Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings
of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions
to an Old Problem
By JOSHUA DRESSLER*
The law of accomplice1 liability is perhaps now so widely accepted
that few scholars have examined the soundness of its theoretical founda-
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1973, Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles.
1. This Article uses the terms "accomplice" and "secondary" party or actor in generic
form to include all persons who were described at common law as "principals in the second
degree" or "accessories before the fact." The term "accomplice" does not include the perpe-
trators of crime ("primary" parties or actors), who were identified at common law as "princi-
pals in the first degree." For the definition of these terms, see infra notes 12-14 &
accompanying text. Those described at common law as "accessories after the fact" now are
punished less severely than other accomplices and principals in the first degree. W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRiMINAL LAW 495 (1982). Because such actors do not assist in
the commission of the crime, but rather hinder law enforcement officials in their apprehension
of the perpetrator and accomplices, the theories and reforms described in this Article do not
apply to them.
In addition, this Article does not discuss in detail the law pertaining to the substantive
crime of conspiracy or the legal accountability of conspirators, as distinguished from tradi-
tional accomplices. Usually, there is no need to consider separately the two forms of accounta-
bility because a co-conspirator will actually aid in the crime; at the least, the act of agreeing
encourages, and thereby aids the other actor. Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Con-
spiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 998-99 (1959). As such, the co-conspirator is punishable as an
accomplice. In many cases an accomplice is a co-conspirator, subject to prosecution for the
inchoate offense of conspiracy. Some jurisdictions purport to punish co-conspirators for the
actions of their criminal partners, even if they do not assist in the crimes. See, e.g., Pinkerton
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946) (defendant held responsible for the crimes commit-
ted by his brother while defendant was in prison because the crimes were committed in fur-
therance of their conspiracy or were reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural
consequence of their unlawful agreement). In fact, however, the conspiracy doctrine is usually
applied to an actor sufficiently involved in the planning of the offense that usual accomplice
doctrine suffices. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) comment at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953)
(current version at MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). The Pink-
erton doctrine has been heavily criticized, W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra, at 515, and is
rejected by the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment at 20-21 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1953) (current version at MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft
1962)). The author, too, would abolish the doctrine, to the extent that it really exists. How-
ever, for purposes of this Article, all of the arguments pertaining to the moral significance of
the requirement of causation to accomplice liability, see infra notes 65-96 & accompanying
text, apply even more forcefully to Pinkerton conspiracy theory.
tions.2 We take for granted that those who assist others to rob, rape, or
kill-but who do not directly commit those injuries-will be judged and
punished as if they were the actual robbers, rapists, or killers. To treat
accomplices as if they had actually perpetrated the crime, however, devi-
ates from the normal rules of criminal liability. 3 Even if appropriate,
such deviation deserves explanation. 4
The problem does not end here. Why does the law treat all second-
ary parties alike, despite their varied levels of contribution to crime?
Why is the person who renders minor encouragement or trivial assis-
tance treated the same as the mastermind behind a crime? Why does the
criminal law potentially equate the villainy of an Iago 5 with the loyalty of
a spouse who furnishes a lunch to her6 perpetrator-husband? Are the
answers pragmatic or principled?7
2. It is very difficult to find scholarly literature regarding the theoretical basis of accom-
plice law. See, however, Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1941); Robinson,
Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984) (dealing with all forms of imputed liabil-
ity); Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for Acts of.Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930) (address-
ing all concepts of vicarious responsibility). Professor George Fletcher, who has made the
same observation regarding the dearth of literature, G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 637 n.4 (1978), provides an extremely insightful comparison of Anglo-American accom-
plice law to the law of various European countries. Id. at 634-82. Professor Sanford Kadish
recently published the finest article on the subject. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A
Study in the Interpretration of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (1985). The quality of the
article and the deserved stature of Professor Kadish may result in increased interest in the
subject. See infra note 21 & accompanying text.
3. Accomplice law deviates from traditional legal rules in the sense that crimes are de-
fined as if the accomplice actually committed the acts that constitute the offense. For example,
the murderer "kills" and the rapist "intentionally has sexual intercourse with" or "carnally
knows" the victim. The accomplice does none of these things, yet she is convicted of murder
or rape, not of "aiding a murder" or "aiding a rapist."
4. Robinson, supra note 2, at 613.
5. W. SHAKESPEARE, Othello, The Moor of Venice, in THE LIVING SHAKESPEARE 821-
72 (0. Campbell ed. 1949). Iago has been described as the "last and most sinister incarnation
of the Vice Dissimulation, the villain of many a morality play." Id. at 814. By cynical decep-
tion lago convinces Othello to kill his beloved Desdemona. This author uses Iago as a meta-
phor for the most evil accomplice. Since Iago did not intend, or even foresee, the ultimate
crime he motivated, it is not even clear that he would be a legal accomplice.
6. See Alexander v. State, 20 Ala. 432, 433, 102 So. 597, 598 (1925). The accomplice in
question here was female. See infra text accompanying note 60. However, for purposes of
simplicity, this author will treat all hypothetical accomplices as female, and all perpetrators as -
male. Real parties will be identified by their actual gender.
7. That is, is there a coherent reason why each is equally guilty of the perpetrator's
crime, or is it merely that it is difficult to draw meaningful lines between the various types of
accomplices, or to quantify the level of contribution of any accomplice? Various scholars have
noted such difficulties in line-drawing. G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 655; G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 381-82 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as G. WIL-
LIAMS, THE GENERAL PART]; Kadish, supra note 2, at 357-61. For discussion of and re-
sponses to this problem, see infra notes 190-207 & accompanying text.
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A doctrine as old8 and basic as accomplice accountability should be
reexamined periodically, if only to better understand the general con-
cepts of criminal law and how they interrelate. 9 In this case, however,
reassessment is especially valuable because our basic legal assumptions
regarding the appropriate guilt and punishment of accomplices are quite
possibly wrong. This Article demonstrates that accomplice liability rules
may be unjust, and not incidentally, counter-utilitarian, because-unlike
all other aspects of criminal responsibility-they are not tied to the doc-
trine of causation. This Article contends that even though those who
intentionally, unjustifiably, and inexcusably aid others in criminal con-
duct should be punished, the degree of an accomplice's crime and pun-
ishment should depend on the presence or absence of a causal connection
between the secondary party's assistance and the ultimate injury.
The Article reviews the role of causation in the theory of criminal
responsibility, explores possible rationales for its diminished importance
in accomplice law, and suggests three alternative approaches to deter-
mining the criminal liability and punishment of accomplices. The Arti-
cle analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of a "substantial participation"
test, a "control or hegemony" test, and a "causation" test. It also sug-
gests that reform of accomplice law similar to that recommended here
may be constitutionally compelled in death penalty cases. Finally, the
Article proposes specific statutory language that applies the more theo-
retically coherent causation test to criminal liability for conduct of
others.
Ultimately, the suggestions in this Article will be controversial. Vir-
tually any call for change in a doctrine so old and rarely considered will
be subjected to careful questioning. The lines drawn in this Article be-
tween parties to crime, however, belong in any penal code that attempts
to calibrate guilt and punishment on a retributive scale of personal re-
sponsibility for wrongdoing. Although the distinctions are, perhaps, less
compelling for utilitarian jurisdictions, the Article nevertheless serves the
important purpose of refocusing attention on a fundamental aspect of
8. The issue of moral accountability for the wrongdoing of others is as old as the Bible.
Compare Deuteronomy 5:9 (King James) ("[Flor I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visit-
ing the iniquity of the fathers upon the children. . . ."(emphasis added)) with Ezekiel 18:19,
20 (King James) ("The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the
father. . . ."). See also the provocative insights of Herbert Morris regarding the possibility
that persons share responsibility "to all men,for all men." H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNO-
CENCE 111-38 (1976) (emphasis in original).
9. There is nothing more practical than good theory. Robinson, supra note 2, at 623.
Once we are forced to justify the reasons for a doctrine, it is easier to understand and apply the
doctrine. Inconsistencies between different parts of the criminal law may also surface.
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criminal liability too rarely subjected to the careful gaze of the legal
community.
Review of Accomplice Law
Early Anglo-American accomplice law was intricate ° and fre-
quently illogical."1 Felony law distinguished between "principals," who
were either of the first degree or of the second degree, 12 and "accesso-
10. For a summary of the intricate common-law rules, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 735-66 (3d ed. 1982). For an example of how intricate common-law principles
can become, see Note, Parties to Crime in Texas-Principal or Accomplice, 18 Sw. L.J. 516
(1964).
11. One of the least logical rules-called "quite absurd" by two scholars-was that an
accessory before the fact could not be convicted of a crime if a principal was not convicted. R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 755-57. This rule applied regardless of the reason for
the nonconviction of the primary party, even including his death. For discussion of a fre-
quently criticized modern rule of accomplice liability, see infra note 36 & accompanying text.
12. The perpetrator of the crime, that is, the one who, with the mens rea required for the
crime, engaged in the conduct defined by the crime, was described as the principal in the first
degree. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *34; W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 496; 1 0. WARREN, WARREN ON HOMICIDE § 62, at 213 (1938); G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 346-47. To complicate matters, an actor was a principal in the first
degree even if he did not commit the physical acts that constitute the crime, if he used an
innocent instrumentality (e.g., by fraud or coercion, or manipulation of an insane party) to
commit the crime. Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (1905) (When one assists a mad-
man to kill, the inciter is the perpetrator.); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at *35; W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 496-97. The so-called "innocent instrumentality" doctrine could
cause difficulties when the principal in the first degree coerced another to commit an act that
the former could not legally commit. For example, a husband coerces X to have nonconsen-
sual intercourse with husband's wife. X is innocent because of duress. Under the innocent
instrumentality rule, the husband is a principal in the first degree. The difficulty is that a
husband could not legally rape his wife. State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731, 25 So. 372 (1899).
What is done with the husband in this case? At times, a court simply threw up its institutional
hands and concluded that the actor could be convicted either as a principal or as an accom-
plice. See Regina v. Cogan, [1976] 2 Q.B. 217; G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
319-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK]. A similar problem occurs
when the crime cannot be perpetrated by proxy. Kadish, supra note 2, at 372-85. Thus, if D
orders X to have intercourse with Y, can D be convicted as a principal in the first degree for the
crime of "carnally knowing" the female, even though he did not have intercourse with her?
See Dusenbery v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 770, 263 S.E.2d 392 (1980) (Security guard, with
gun drawn, orders youths in automobile to have intercourse while he observes; held: guard
cannot be convicted of crime because the statutory language presupposes that the perpetrator
commit the physical acts.); see also Morris v. Tolman, [1923] 1 K.B. 166 (Defendant took out
license for vehicle and his servant used it without permission outside the terms of the license;
held: defendant is not perpetrator because he did not improperly use the license. The servant
is not an accomplice because there was no principal, and he is not a principal in the first degree
because he could not be said to have been the licensee.).
There can be two or more perpetrators, or principals in the first degree. See G. WIL-
LIAMS, THE GENERAL PART, supra note 7, at 349; Kadish, supra note 2, at 344. For example,
there are two perpetrators when two people independently wound the victim, and the victim
dies as a result of both. People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 559, 57 P. 470, 473 (1899); G. WIL-
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ries," who were either "before the fact" or "after the fact." 13 The basic
difference between a secondary principal and an accessory "before the
fact," both of whom were accomplices, was that the former was at the
scene of a crime when it was committed, while the latter was not.
14
Although it was not always easy to ascertain which category applied,
15
thus requiring courts to develop legal fictions in order to deal with prob-
lematic situations,16 an actor labelled as an accessory was treated quite
differently,17 and potentially more leniently,18 than the perpetrator or ac-
complice at the scene.
Why were accessories treated differently than both accomplices at
the scene and perpetrators? Commentators have documented an early
concern that the death penalty should not reach all parties to felonies.19
LIAMS, THE GENERAL PART, supra note 7, at 349. More problematic is the situation in which
no single actor commits all of the elements of the crime, but several actors in combination do.
For example, X breaks into a house, while Y enters it. In a prosecution for burglary, it is likely
that X and Y will be treated as co-principals in the first degree. It cannot be said that either
was the accomplice because then each was the other's accomplice and there would be no perpe-
trator. Treatment of the parties as co-perpetrators is largely a matter of convenience. See
Kadish, supra note 2, at 344 n.36.
A principal in the second degree is one who is present at, and intentionally aids in, the
commission of a crime with the intent that the offense be committed. She does not commit the
physical acts that constitute the offense. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 497; R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 738.
13. An accessory before the fact was the person who ordered, counseled, encouraged, or
otherwise assisted the principals to commit the offense with the intent that the offense be com-
mitted. An accessory after the fact was the person who, after the crime was completed, gave
aid to the felon in order to hinder the latter's apprehension, conviction, or punishment. W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 495. This Article is not concerned with the latter party.
See supra note 1.
14. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 498.
15. E.g., Middleton v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 307, 217 S.W. 1046 (1919).
16. Constructive presence at the scene was sufficient to make one a second degree princi-
pal. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 497-98; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note
10, at 739. She could be a considerable distance away, as long as she was close enough to
assist. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 498.
17. Among other things, matters of venue, pleading, statute of limitations, and, poten-
tially, conviction, were affected by the labels attached. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 1, at 498-500; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 751-58. If a party was
labelled as a principal in the second degree rather than as an accomplice before the fact, such
distinctions and problems disappeared.
18. The accessory before the fact could not be convicted of the crime that she aided if the
principal was not convicted, whether the nonconviction of the perpetrator was the result of
acquittal, of plea bargaining, of flight from justice, or of death. See supra note 11 & accompa-
nying text. Similarly, the accessory before the fact, but not the principal in the second degree,
could not be convicted of a higher degree of crime than the principal; the accessory, however,
could be convicted of a lesser degree of crime. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 755-
58.
19. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 730, 751; 2 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 234 (1883).
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Specifically, the accessory was considered less deserving of execution.
Blackstone suggested a utilitarian explanation for the more lenient treat-
ment of accessories. 20 Generally, however, explanations for the rules dis-
tinguishing some accomplices from others are as difficult to uncover as
are explicit theoretical explanations for why we punish accomplices at
all.21
When considered in relation to either comparative moral blame or
comparative dangerousness, the legal distinctions between accessories
and secondary principals were morally counter-intuitive 22 and probably
empirically indefensible. 23 The complexity of the rules only aggravated
the perception that the distinctions were without merit.
Legislative reform ultimately ensued,24 and the legal distinctions be-
tween perpetrators and all secondary criminals were apparently abol-
ished.2 5 Today, in the great majority of cases, all parties to crime are
20. And perhaps if a distinction were constantly to be made between the punish-
ment of principals and accessories, even before the fact, the latter to be treated with a
little less severity than the former, it might prevent the perpetration of many crimes,
by increasing the difficulty of finding a person to execute the deed itself; as his danger
would be greater than that of his accomplices, by reason of the differences of his
punishment.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *39.40 (emphasis in original).
21. Many nineteenth and early twentieth-century treatises describe, but do not justify,
accomplice accountability doctrine. See, e.g., 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMI-
NAL LAW 499-501 (2d ed. 1858); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 307-08
(1903); 1 W. RUSSEL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 29-57 (1819); 1 F.
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 111-23 (3d ed.
1855). Courts rarely help. One court recently "explained" the rationale of accomplice guilt
this way: "Accomplices generally are punished as severely as the principal, on the premise
that when a crime has been committed, those who aid in its commission should be punished
like the principal." People v. Shafou, 416 Mich. 113, 133, 330 N.W.2d 647, 654 (1982); see
also Sayre, supra note 2, at 695 ("From the beginning there has never been the slightest doubt
that one who commands, counsels or procures another to commit a crime is himself guilty of
the crime."). For discussion of the apparent theories underlying accomplice accountability
doctrine, see infra notes 97-111 & accompanying text.
22. For example, if an accessory before the fact convinces a weak-willed perpetrator to
commit a crime, it is plausible that the accessory is more blameworthy than the primary party.
If the perpetrator is not convicted, perhaps because of death or the presence of some personal
defense extraneous to the social harm he committed, for example, if the principal in the first
degree is acquitted as a result of entrapment, United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.
1971); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968), it is hardly obvious
why the accomplice, who lacked any such defense, should be immune from punishment.
23. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 764. For discussion of the empirical
evidence regarding the comparative dangerousness of accomplices and principals, see infra
notes 112-26 & accompanying text.
24. For a history of early British statutory reform, see 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 19, at
231-36. For a discussion of statutory reform in this country, see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 1, 500-01; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 759-66.
25. Whether the result of poor statutory drafting or judicial stubbornness, statutes that
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treated alike. 26 Each is guilty of the crime or crimes perpetrated by the
primary actor, and each is subject to the same punishment for the of-
fenses perpetrated. Whether or not the accomplice is present at the scene
of the crime, she is a party to a crime perpetrated by another if she either
assists the perpetrator to commit the crime, or influences his conduct,
with the intention that the perpetrator commit the crime.27 Some juris-
dictions, contrary to the common law,28 hold the secondary actor respon-
sible if she merely attempts to assist the perpetrator. 29 Secondary parties,
as at common law, are also guilty of unintended crimes committed by the
primary party if those crimes are a natural and probable consequence of
the intended offense.30 As a matter of theory, secondary parties are usu-
ally said to be accountable for the acts of the primary actor.31 Their lia-
purported to abolish all common-law distinctions have not been universally successful. See W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 1, at 501; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 759-60;
Note, Principals and Accessories, Some Modern Problems, 25 ILL. L. REV. 845, 845-46 (1931).
26. At least Maryland seems to apply common-law doctrine nearly in its entirety. Lewis
v. State, 285 Md. 705, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979); Williamson v. State, 36 Md. App. 405, 374 A.2d
909 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 282 Md. 100, 382 A.2d 588 (1978). But see Jones v. State,
302 Md. 153, 486 A.2d 184 (1985) (An accessory may be convicted of a greater crime than that
which the principal is convicted of.).
Although it is true today that all parties are treated alike in the criminal law codes, prose-
cutors may treat accomplices more leniently in the initial charging process, or during plea
bargaining. For example, a prosecutor may be willing to permit an accomplice to plead guilty
to a lesser crime or to recommend a lesser penalty (assuming the penal code permits judicial
discretion) in exchange for a guilty plea and the testimony of the accomplice against the perpe-
trator. Juries also may be less willing to mete out the ultimate penalty of death for accom-
plices. See infra notes 152, 224 & accompanying text. However, these nonlegislative
deviations from the ordinary system only serve to support the thesis developed in this Article
that the failure of legislatures to draw distinctions among parties to crime violates both utilita-
rian and moral intuitions.
27. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 502-12 (requirements for
accomplice liability).
28. E.g., Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 449-50 (1893) (expressing the usual rule
that assistance, not merely intent to assist, is required); see also Kadish, supra note 2, at 356.
29. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(a)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (A person is
an accomplice of another person if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the offense,
she aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person.). A substantial minority of states have
adopted this approach. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303(B)(2) (1978 & Supp. 1984-1985);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-303(1)(b) (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271(2)(b) (1979); HA-
WAII REV. STAT. § 702-222(1)(b) (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2(c) (Smith-Hurd
1976); Ky. REv. STAT. § 502.020(1)(b) (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)(A)
(1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.041(1), (2) (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302(3)
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8(III)(a) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6c(l)(b) (West
1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155(2)(b) (1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(c)(1)(ii) (Pur-
don 1983); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
30. Sayre, supra note 2, at 702-06. The Model Penal Code rejects this approach and
generally only permits conviction of the accomplice for those crimes she intended to promote
or facilitate. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
31. The Model Penal Code expressly states that liability is based on "the conduct of
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bility is derivative of the latter's conduct; 32 they generally are not
considered to be guilty of a separate crime of aiding.
33
The reforms resolved some, but not all, of the difficulties with ac-
complice law.34 It is troubling, however, that the rush to repeal indefen-
sible distinctions was so powerful that there appears to have been no
legislative consideration of other theories that may justify distinctions be-
tween parties. This backlash from the mindlessness of earlier common
law distinctions remains today. 3
5
The Role of Causation in Evaluating Criminal Responsibility
Comparing the Modes of Responsibility
Although many aspects of accomplice law potentially are troub-
ling,36 most are not the concern of this Article. The basis for criticism
another person for which he is legally accountable ...... MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). Courts and commentators frequently have made the same
point, albeit implicitly. E.g., United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827)
("[I]t is the known and familiar principle of criminal jurisprudence, that he who [aids] .. .is
guilty of the crime, and the act is his act."); People v. Carter, 415 Mich. 558, 575, 330 N.W.2d
314, 322 (1982) ("[A]iding and abetting is not in and of itself a substantive offense. It is,
rather, a means of connecting a person with a completed [offense]. ... ); R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, supra note 10, at 732; Kadish, supra note 2, at 337; Perkins, supra note 2, at 586, 590.
32. G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 636; Kadish, supra note 2, at 337; see People v.
Walker, 18 Cal. 3d 232, 241-42, 555 P.2d 306, 311, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 525 (1976). Bishop has
described the relationship of the parties as "completely attached," "like a shadow." 1 J.
BISHOP, supra note 21, at 499, 501.
33. Unfortunately, at times the common law or statutes have blurred the "one crime"
concept. One Massachusetts court, for example, insisted that the acts of the principal are not
the acts of the accessory, and vice versa, because "in law, they are different crimes." Common-
wealth v. DiStasio, 297 Mass. 347, 357, 8 N.E.2d 923, 929 (1937). Similarly, the typical com-
mon-law venue rule required the accessory to be tried in the county in which she assisted the
principal. This requirement conflicts with the concept of derivative liability.
34. See supra note 25 & accompanying text.
35. Few scholars today appear to be interested in the subject of accomplice liability. Two
recent exceptions are Professors Kadish and Fletcher. See supra note 2 & accompanying text.
Kadish's recent article, however, purports to be descriptive and does not consider possible
reforms. Fletcher does consider alternative means of dealing with accomplices, but he reaches
no conclusions.
36. One of the most troubling and frequently criticized aspects of accomplice liability is
the rule that holds the accomplice responsible for crimes she did not want to occur, but that
were natural and probable consequences of the crime she intentionally aided. See supra note
30 & accompanying text. The effect of this rule is to convict an accomplice with a lower mens
rea than is required to perpetrate the crime. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 513
(describing as the "better view" that such guilt not be permitted); Kadish, supra note 2, at 351-
52 (suggesting the same problem with the law); Robinson, supra note 2, at 638 (demonstrating
that this and related doctrines permit conviction based on insufficient culpability); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment at 24-26 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953) (current version at
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)) (rejecting the doctrine of natural
and probable consequences and requiring, instead, that the accomplice purposely facilitate).
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here focuses on the very core of accomplice law: its theoretical founda-
tions. Specifically, Anglo-American law ascertains the legal guilt and
calibrates the appropriate punishment for accomplices in a manner that
differs fundamentally from that applied to perpetrators. Unlike the per-
son who commits the crime, the accomplice need not be causally tied to
the harm for which she is punished. 37
For the perpetrator, the rule is strict, straightforward, and virtually
without exception: the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt 38 that but for 39 the perpetrator's acts, the prohibited social harm
would not have occurred when it did.40 If A fires a gun at B with the
intention of killing B, but B is already dead from an unrelated source, A
is not legally responsible for B's death. A may be morally as evil as if he
had caused the death. Nonetheless, despite A's actions and mens rea, he
is not a murderer because, quite simply, he did not cause the death. He
may be punished, however, for any harm he did cause. 41 Similarly, if B
were alive at the time of the shooting, but A's endeavors to kill misfire,
37. State ex reL Martin v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 69, 15 So. 722, 739 (1894); see Wilcox v.
Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464 (presence at illegal concert with failure to express objection
makes actor an accomplice); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 505; G. WILLIAMS,
THE GENERAL PART, supra note 7, at 359, 381-83; Kadish, supra note 2, at 357.
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
39. The common law also determines whether the defendant is the proximate cause of the
harm. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 251; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10,
at 774-824. This doctrine ensures that actors are not held responsible for effects too remote
from the actors' conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft
1962) (conduct "too remote or accidental in its occurence to have a [just] bearing on the
actor's liability"). Because the common law does not require an actual causal connection be-
tween the accomplice's conduct and the resultant harm, see supra note 37 & accompanying
text, it follows that no proximate causal connection is required either. This Article will not
focus on the proximate causation issue. In most cases if there is a "but for" connection, there
should be no problem defending liability under proximate causation doctrine. See infra note
172 & accompanying text.
40. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 249; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note
10, at 771-72. The phrase "when it did" is vitally important to the causation analysis. When A
shoots and kills B, it is true that but for A's conduct, B would have died sooner or later,
perhaps as a result of old age, or possibly as a result of some subsequent homicidal act. None-
theless, A has caused the death because he shortened B's life. Payne v. Commonwealth, 255
Ky. 533, 541, 75 S.W.2d 14, 19 (1934); J. SMrrH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 270 (4th ed.
1978). The importance of timing of the harm to causation analysis can materialize in other
less straightforward circumstances. See infra notes 46, 200-07 & accompanying text.
41. For example, A may have damaged the corpse or recklessly endangered others by his
conduct. A may also be guilty of attempted murder if the conduct is thought to involve factual
rather than legal impossibility, or occurs in a jurisdiction in which such distinctions are inap-
plicable. People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725, 735, 363 N.E.2d 1155, 1161, 395 N.Y.S.2d 419,
426 (1977) (Shooting a corpse that the actor believed was alive constitutes attempted murder.);
see United States v. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. 278, 281 (1962) (Sexual intercourse with a dead wo-
man that the actor thought was alive is not attempted rape.). For discussion of causation as it
pertains to the inchoate offense of attempt, see infra notes 72-83 & accompanying text.
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we punish A for the harm he caused4 2 and not for the harm he tried to
cause. We prosecute A for assault or attempted murder, but not for mur-
der. Significantly, the common law, which at first did not punish attempt
at all, subsequently punished it at a lesser level than the completed of-
fense.43 Even today, punishment for attempt ordinarily is mitigated.44
The only potential45 exception to this common-law rule is that of
concurrent causes. Two entirely independent actors or forces may con-
verge simultaneously upon a victim under circumstances in which either
force or actor alone would have caused the very injury suffered by the
victim at the time it was actually inflicted. Usually, however, the harm
that occurs is not precisely the harm that would have been inflicted if
42. At least intangible harm results from attempting to commit some other crime. There
is apprehension felt by society, if not by the individual victim. G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at
144-45.
43. It was first punished, as a misdemeanor, in Rex v. Scofield, Caldecott Mag. Cas. 397
(1784).
44. Most states punish attempt less seriously than the completed offense. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-4-2(d) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100(d)(1)-(5) (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1001 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-703 (Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West
Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04(4) (West Supp.
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1006 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 18-306 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 8-4(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3301(c) (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 506.010(4) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 152 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 6 (West 1980); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. ch. 750.92, § 92 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.17 (West 1969);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.011 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.201 (1983); NEV. REV.
SrAT. § 208.070 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05
(Consol. Supp. 1984-1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 42 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-4-1 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-501 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-102
(1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1974); VA. CODE § 18.2-26 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.28.010 (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-8 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.32(1) (West 1982).
The Model Penal Code rejects this approach by treating the inchoate crimes of attempt,
conspiracy, and solicitation equally in seriousness with the completed offense. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Some states partially follow this approach,
imposing the same punishment as for the completed offense in some, but not all, cases. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-51 (West 1972) (same punishment except Class A felonies
reduced to Class B felonies); N.H. REV. STAT. § 629:1 (1974) (same punishment except that
attempt to commit murder reduced to Class A felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4 (West 1982)
(same punishment except that attempt to commit first degree crime is crime of the second
degree); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (Supp. 1983) (reduced punishment permitted under
specified circumstances).
A few states fully follow the Model Penal Code approach. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 531 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 705-502 (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 644A (1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-103 (1983).
45. Questions of causation have been analyzed far more often in the realm of tort than in
criminal law. J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra note 40, at 42. Consequently, torts doctrine is
more certain.
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only one actor were involved; in these circumstances, there is no diffi-
culty in the causal analysis. 46 However, even in the empirically rare case
when each force is sufficient, but unnecessary, to cause the harm that
actually occurred, the common law would probably permit criminal lia-
bility if it were proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
a substantial,4 7 but not necessary, factor in causing the injury.
The "substantial factor" approach is thought to prevent the morally
counter-intuitive result that one or more criminal actors might avoid
punishment because of the freak fortuity of an independent and simulta-
neous action by another. In fact, this would not be the result of retaining
the "but for" requirement of causation. Even if it were not possible to
prove that only one force caused the harm,4 8 or that the multiple actions
combined so as to create a greater harm than either would have commit-
ted alone,49 or even that the multiple actions combined so as to speed up
the ultimate harm5 0-in which cases the "but for" analysis works ade-
quately-any party to such a freak occurrence would be punishable for
the crime of attempt by application of "but for" analysis. No other pos-
sible exception to "but for" jurisprudence is found in the law of crimes by
perpetrators. 51 In every case, the law demands some form of causation.
46. For example, two independent parties may fire their guns at a victim. If it can be
shown that the victim died faster as a result of the two wounds than he would have died from
just one wound, there is no conceptual difficulty with treating both actors as "but for" causes
of the death. The factual causation question is asked in terms of whether the harm would have
occurred when it did. See supra note 40 & accompanying text. Each has shortened the life of
the victim.
47. See generally H.L.A. HART & A. HONORP-, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 116-19, 263
(1959) (substantial factor analysis); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 772-73 (con-
current causation discussed); J. SMrrH & B. HOGAN, supra note 40, at 274.
The term "substantial" is a misnomer in the sense that something cannot be a substantial
factor in causing an event that was going to occur when it did anyway. The factor is "substan-
tial" only in the sense that the actor's conduct would have caused the injury under other cir-
cumstances. The doctrine also is accused of being undefinable. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORi,
supra, at 118.
48. For example, A fires a gun, and the bullet strikes V in the heart, while B fires a gun,
and the bullet strikes V in a nonvital organ. Here, A, not B, is the cause of death.
49. For example, A fires a gun, and the bullet strikes V in a nonvital organ, so that V
would not have died from the wound; B does the same thing. As a result of both wounds, V
dies.
50. See supra notes 40, 46 & accompanying text.
51. Although inchoate crimes such as attempt appear to belie this assertion, they do not.
The actus reus of the crime of attempt is an act of perpetration that constitutes a substantial
act in furtherance of the target offense or is in dangerous proximity to the target offense. Cau-
sation is required, then, in the sense that the defendant's voluntary actions must cause this
actus reus; they must cause the defendant to be in dangerous proximity to the completed of-
fense. Of course, the utilitarian justification for the crime of attempt is to prevent harm before
it occurs. So viewed, "cause" is not required, but only in the tautological sense that there is no
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Accomplice liability, however, is complete without such a causal
link.52 It is not that some cases are exceptions to the requirement of
causation. Simply, there is no such requirement. Although some assis-
tance apparently is required, 53 an accomplice is accountable for the ac-
tions of the perpetrator even if the desired consequences would have
occurred precisely when they did without her conduct. The most trivial
assistance is sufficient basis to render the secondary actor accountable for
the actions of the primary actor. Although it is frequently said that pres-
ence alone at the scene of the crime is insufficient to make one account-
able, 54 presence plus little else may be sufficient. Meeting with the
perpetrator before the crime is committed, or serving as a lookout, can be
adequate to establish accomplice liability.5 5 Evidence of the perpetra-
tor's awareness of the presence of the "accomplice" may demonstrate
encouragement of the perpetrator. 56 Presence may encourage by adding
apparent numerical strength. 57 Presence with applause at an illegal event
can be sufficient. 58 Holding the perpetrator's child while he commits the
crime is adequate assistance. 59 Merely preparing food for the perpetrator
can qualify. 6° And woe to she who lends another a smock to wear during
a crime so the latter does not get dirty,6' or who asks burglars in advance
to get bananas while they take the goods. 62 Aiding is required, but the
degree of influence is immaterial. 63
This result follows from the separation of causation from the issue
of legal responsibility. Once the secondary party is found accountable,
she is not punished for her own actions or for the extent of her assistance.
Rather, she is punished for the actions of the perpetrator because acces-
sory law is derivative. Once the prosecutor proves an act of assistance
with the required mens rea, the accomplice becomes the perpetrator's
required harm to cause. Beyond this, there really is harm in cases of attempt. See supra note
42.
52. See supra note 37 & accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 28-29 & accompanying text.
54. E.g., State v. Gomez, 102 Ariz. 432, 432 P.2d 444 (1967); State v. Ham, 238 N.C. 94,
76 S.E.2d 346 (1953); State v. Hunter, 77 S.C. 119, 57 S.E. 637 (1906); Regina v. Coney, 8
Q.B.D. 534 (1882).
55. People v. Hughes, 70 Cal. App. 2d 457, 161 P.2d 285 (1945).
56. McCarty v. State, 26 Miss. 299, 303 (1853).
57. Fuller v. State, 43 Ala. App. 632, 638, 198 So. 2d 625, 630 (1966).
58. See Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464; Regina v. Young, 173 Eng. Rep 655
(1838).
59. State v. Duran, 86 N.M. 594, 526 P.2d 188 (1974).
60. See Alexander v. State, 20 Ala. 432, 433, 102 So. 597, 598 (1925).
61. This German case is described in G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 677.
62. State v. Helmenstein, 163 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1968).
63. Fuson v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 804, 809, 251 S.W. 995, 997 (1923).
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shadow" and is considered as culpable as her perpetrating cohort.
The Moral Importance of Causation
It does not necessarily follow, of course, from the fact that causation
is required to evaluate the legal responsibility of perpetrators but not of
accomplices, that the treatment of accomplices as if they were perpetra-
tors is wrong. Nor does it follow that distinctions between parties to
crime must be tied to the concept of causation. Alternative approaches
are addressed later in this Article.65 At this point, it is sufficient to re-
mind ourselves of the historical moral value of causation in ascertaining
and apportioning criminal responsibility of perpetrators.
The common law is wedded to the concept of personal, rather than
vicarious, responsibility for crimes. Professor Sayre has described the
notion that criminal liability is "intensely personal" 66 as "deep rooted."'67
Our demand that responsibility be personal is the result of the "inarticu-
late, subconscious sense of justice of the man on the street."'68 Personal
responsibility is the "only sure foundation of law."' 69 Causation, then, is
the instrument we employ to ensure that responsibility is personal. It
links the actor to the harm. It helps us to understand who should be
punished by answering how the harm occurred. Causation is, as Profes-
sor Jerome Hall writes, "an ultimate notion, deeply characteristic of
human thought and expressed even among the most primitive people, in
their effort to understand the 'way of things.' "70
Sine qua non causation serves a second, more sophisticated, role:
assuring that those who are legally blameworthy are given their retribu-
tively deserved punishment. It is much more difficult to defend this use
of causation by application of the utilitarian principles of specific and
general deterrence.71 Yet, despite the potential objections of utilitarians,
the common law and modern statutes pertaining to perpetrators of crime
apply this retributive-based use of the principle of causation. The failure
64. See supra note 32 & accompanying text.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 164-70.
66. Sayre, supra note 2, at 702.
67. Id. at 717.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 248 (2d ed. 1960). But see
G. WILLIAMS, THE GENERAL PART, supra note 7, at 266 (Vicarious responsibility was not
offensive to "primitive" people.).
71. For an explanation of why these utilitarian values are possibly undermined by the
requirement of causation, see infra note 81 & accompanying text.
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of the law to honor the same values in the context of accomplices, there-
fore, is all the more troubling for its apparent inconsistency.
This second role of causation must be explained carefully. The theo-
logian or ethicist frequently makes moral judgments based on a person's
intentions and motives. The externality of those intentions has only sec-
ondary value to him.72 On the other hand, any nonutilitarian juridical
conception of blame focuses initially and primarily on the external harm
caused by the criminal actor. The harm or actus reus of the crime is the
indispensable justification for punitive intervention. 73 Harm is the meas-
ure of the actor's degree of legal guilt and of his deserved punishment. To
the adherent of a retributory philosophy, guilt and punishment must be
initially74 proportional to the value75 of the harm the actor caused. It is
to that degree to which the moral equilibrium of society has been dis-
turbed.76 This is presumably77 the maximum amount of redress to which
society is entitled.
72. Kant distinguishes between juridical and ethical conceptions of right. The goals dif-
fer in the two contexts: in the former, one attempts to apply justice; in the latter, a moral actor
attempts to be virtuous. Juridical conceptions of duty and right conduct are external, whereas
ethical ones are internal. See generally I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS IN ETHICAL
PHILOSOPHY 17-20 (J. Ellington trans. 1983).
73. "[T]he aim of the criminal law is not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain external
results." Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 20, 48 N.E. 770, 770 (1897). See gener-
ally G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 466-69 (no punishment without wrongdoing). The author
previously described the role of harm in the criminal law. Dressier, New Thoughts About the
Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethink-
ing, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 79, 83 (1984).
74. See infra note 77 & accompanying text.
75. Obviously, the "value" is not ascertainable by any straightforward formula. The
harm may involve both tangible and intangible injuries. See supra note 42 & accompanying
text. Similarly, the punishment inflicted will rarely be literal lex talionis.
76. Many others have made this point before. Herbert Morris has written especially well
about the nature of punishment and how punishment should be based on conceptions of bene-
fits and burdens. H. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 126-27 (discussing the relationship of causing
harm to inchoate offenses); Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968); see
also G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 459-66. The author, too, has made this point before.
Dressler, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Propor-
tionality and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, 1073-81 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law]; Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another:
Accessories and Capital Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 17, 32-36 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Dressier, Jurisprudence of Death].
77. Retributivism is premised on the theory that humans possess free will. Without the
choice to do right or wrong, it would be immoral to punish the person who does wrong.
Consequently, the retributivist assumes that because any wrongdoer acted with full free will,
he is fully accountable for his misconduct. He may be punished to the full extent of the harm.
Nevertheless, there may be cases in which the assumption of free will is wrong. The actor may
suffer from some mental illness or another condition that has undermined his capability of free
choice. Additionally, circumstances may limit the opportunity for free choice, or the actor
may not have committed the social harm intentionally. When there is evidence of any of these
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This theory implies that as the harm caused by the crime decreases,
so too should the severity of the punishment. Hence, the would-be mur-
derer who mistakenly shoots the corpse78 is guilty of attempted murder
and not murder, and the common law and most modem statutes author-
ize less punishment than if he had succeeded in his endeavors.79 He is
treated leniently even though his moral culpability can be as great as that
of the murderer, 0 and in spite of the utilitarian's argument that he is as
dangerous as the murderer.
Although many utilitarian commentators find such rules incompre-
hensible,81 this retributive theory of punishment, with its focus on causa-
tion of harm, explains the common law and modem treatment of the
factors, then the adherent of a retributory philosophy would mitigate punishment. See gener-
ally G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 454-83 (effect of free will on responsibility for harm).
78. See supra note 41 & accompanying text.
79. See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
80. They are equally culpable in the sense that both acted intentionally and with equal
free will. See supra note 77 & accompanying text.
81. There is such an abundance of literature condemning the common law and statutory
system of mitigating punishment for inchoate offenses that it sometimes seems difficult to de-
fend the common law. It is clear, however, that criticism of the rule comes largely from those
who reject conceptions of retributive justice in favor of utilitarian values. It is undoubtedly
true that if punishment were calibrated to dangerousness of the actor, e.g., specific deterrence,
the common law and statutory practice would make no sense. The same applies to concepts of
rehabilitation. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 5.05 comment at 178-79 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960) (current version at MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). It is
less clear how punishment should be inflicted under general deterrent theory. If the criminal
actor does not think about the punishment for attempt, but only about the punishment for the
target offense, then utilitarian desire to economize punishment would favor traditional attempt
rules. See id. Or it may be argued that we want attempters to have an incentive to desist, so
punishment should be mitigated. It is not always possible, however, to desist after the attempt.
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 129-30 (1968); H.L.A. HART & A.
HONORf-, supra note 47, at 354-55. It has been said that the only theory that can really justify
the practice of punishing attempt less severely than the completed offense is a retributive the-
ory based on retaliation. Michael & Weschler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide H, 37
COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 1295 n.79 (1937); Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1501
(1974). Commentators who make this claim define retaliation as punitive treatment measured
by the harm done. They differentiate retaliation from traditional retribution, which they con-
sider to imply punishment based on moral guilt. Michael & Weschler, supra, at 1295 n.79.
Professor Hart criticizes this retaliative form of punishment because it "confuse[s] punishment
with compensation." H.L.A. HART, supra, at 130-31. Nonetheless, he and others concede
that mitigation for attempt is an "almost universal practice." Id. at 129; see also Schulhofer,
supra, at 1501. Some have accepted the approach as a necessary accommodation to the
amount of resentment felt by people in relation to the amount of harm actually inflicted.
H.L.A. HART, supra, at 131; Michael & Weschler, supra, at 1295 n.80. However, as described
in the text, the common-law approach is entirely sensible because it places harm and culpabil-
ity in their proper places. Perhaps the reason for the reduced guilt and punishment of the
attempter is explained best the same way Professor Sayre explains why we reject the concept of
vicarious responsibility: it is the result of the "inarticulate, subconscious sense of justice of the
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inchoate offense as a crime deserving of less punishment than its com-
pleted counterpart. After all, two actors can be equally blameworthy 82
and yet not equally guilty, because only the degree of guilt necessarily is
tied to the harm implicated. 83
Sine qua non84 causation, therefore, serves as the link between the
indispensable factor of harm and the actor responsible for it. It ensures
both that guilt and punishment are based on personal involvement and
that the stigma of criminal conviction and the pain of criminal punish-
ment that follows are apportioned in relation to the degree each person
has disturbed society's equilibrium.
The eighth amendment prohibition against excessive punishment85
also supports this general thesis. Although respect for federalism has
made the United States Supreme Court unwilling to intrude too deeply
into state penal systems,86 the Court has offered guidance on the princi-
man on the street [that] is the only sure foundation of the law." Sayre, supra note 2, at 717.
For discussion of the concept of vicarious responsibility, see infra note 98.
82. The parties are equally blameworthy in the sense that both acted with equal free will
and each acted intentionally. See supra note 77 & accompanying text.
83. H. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 126-27.
84. When we consider the appropriate punishment for attempted murder of a corpse, we
can most easily sense the truth uniquely captured by "but for," as distinguished from some
other form of causation. The corpse-shooter has the intent to do a specified harm. He is fully
culpable. The only thing that separates him from the completed offense and full punishment is
the absence of contribution to the death. Because the harm already had occurred, we give the
actor the benefit of the intervening fortuity.
Of course, we could always claim to retain the requirement of causation, yet avoid this
result by shifting the meaning of causation to something less than "but for." In the rare situa-
tion of absolutely concurrent, sufficient forces acting upon the victim, the questionable concept
of "substantial factor" may be applied. See supra notes 45-51 & accompanying text. However,
if such a concept is valid with concurrent causes, why not apply it here, too, when the forces
act a second apart rather than concurrently? Assume A shoots B in the abdomen. There is
compelling medical testimony that the wound was mortal. However, it turns out that B legally
became a corpse a split second earlier due to an entirely unrelated fatal heart attack. Can we
not say that A's firing of the gun at B was a "substantial factor" in causing the death because it
would have been the cause of the death under different circumstances? That seems wrong, in
the sense that the bullet did not kill the victim. In fact, however, this is the only way we can
call a force a "substantial factor" in the usual case of concurrent causes. Yet we do not apply a
"substantial factor" test in the heart attack situation. We say that A's voluntary act of shoot-
ing B was not the cause of B's death; the heart attack was the cause. We convict A of at-
tempted murder. Only the thinnest of margins separates the cases-a margin too thin to make
much moral sense. No concept of causation but sine qua non, therefore, can make the impor-
tant retributive point. The substantial factor test fails to make the same point.
85. The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. In turn, "cruel and unusual" has been interpreted to prohibit not only barbaric,
but also excessive, punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-73 (1976).
86. The Court frequently has expressed such concern, but not in a consistent manner.
Occasionally, the Court has applied constitutional principles to restrict state penal authority.
See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (prohibiting as disproportional punishment life
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ples that states should follow. A state can prohibit conduct but not con-
ditions,8 7 and punishment cannot be grossly disproportionate to the
crime.8 8 At least in death penalty cases, "proportionality" is measured in
nonutilitarian fashion wherein the harm inflicted is the primary factor in
evaluating the propriety of the severity of punishment.89 As a result,
execution of a murderer,90 but not of an attempted murderer,91 may be
constitutional. Additionally, when the punishment is death, the Consti-
tution requires individualized punishment. 92 Punishment must be justifi-
able based on the individual's personal involvement in the crime.
Analyzing the constitutionality of executing accomplices to murder,93
imprisonment without parole for multiple offender); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(prohibiting death penalty for crime of rape); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
(preventing a state from placing burden of persuasion on defendant regarding a defense that
affected the actor's culpability); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (prohibiting a
state from criminalizing condition of drug addiction). Usually, however, the Court has
avoided such confrontations with the states. See, eg., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282-84
(1980) (refusal to declare unconstitutional life imprisonment for three-time petty offender "ab-
sent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism" be-
cause lighter sentences "must find their sources and their sustaining force in the legislatures");
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 n.15 (1977) (distinguished Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1972), because broad construction would deprive legislatures of discretion); Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (due in part to "essential considerations of federalism,"
Court refused to extend Robinson v. California, 370 U.S 660 (1972), to conduct that is the
result of alcoholism); Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (although mens rea is
an ancient requirement of common law, not constitutionally required); Fisher v. United States,
328 U.S. 463 (1946) (refusal to require evidence of diminished capacity in capital homicide
case).
87. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1960).
88. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977).
89. Id. Coker was sentenced to death for raping a 16-year-old female after he escaped
from prison while serving a life sentence for previous rapes and a murder. It seems clear,
therefore, that insofar as Coker's dangerousness was concerned, another life sentence would
not protect society. Indeed, Coker told the husband of his most recent victim that he "didn't
have nothing to lose .. d.." I  at 609 n.4. Moreover, assuming arguendo the decency and
rationality of capital punishment, and in terms of any concept of general culpability, Coker
deserved the state's highest penalty. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the death penalty
was excessive because "the murderer kills; the rapist. . . does not." Id. at 598.
90. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
91. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). The reasoning of the Court seems to
require that a life be taken before the death penalty is inflicted. Id. The dissenters in Coker
disagreed with this principle. They saw "no constitutional barrier in punishing by death all
who engage in such activity which consistently poses serious danger of death or grave bodily
harm, regardless of whether the risk comes to fruition in any particular instance." Id. at 620
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Under the dissent's theory, attempted murder also could result in
execution. The dissenters, as utilitarians, would reject the premise that the same punishment
for inchoate offense is excessive.
92. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-03 (1978).
93. See infra notes 209-23 & accompanying text.
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the Court stated in the landmark decision of Enmund v. Florida 94 that
the question is not the "disproportionality of death as a penalty for mur-
der, but rather the validity of capital punishment for [defendant's] own
conduct. The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of [his
cohorts]." 95
Although the Court has not addressed explicitly the relevance of
causation to criminal punishment, the Court's demand in death penalty
cases that the punishment be linked to the harm caused and to the actor's
personal culpability for that harm96 implicitly supports the common-law
moral importance of causation in determining the appropriate punish-
ment for resulting harm.
Accomplice law, then, might be unjustified in ignoring causation. It
conflicts with the usual values of criminal law. It holds persons account-
able for the actions of others. As a result, although the accomplice is
punished because of her own conduct, she is punished to the extent of
another's. She can be punished for harm she did not cause. If accom-
plice law is to be defended, one must either reject as invalid the interre-
lated common-law values of personal accountability and causation, find a
sound basis for distinguishing legal accountability of accomplices from
other criminal law doctrines, or reform accomplice law.
Are the Current Accomplice Rules Justified?
Complicity law differs theoretically from all other criminal law doc-
trine and runs counter to the deeply rooted principles of personal respon-
sibility. Can complicity law be justified?
Providing a Rationale
Neither modem nor ancient treatises adequately explain why ac-
complices are punished for crimes they did not perpetrate, or why their
punishment may be as severe as that given to perpetrators. Although
common moral intuition dictates that all willing participants in crime
should be punished, it would require a leap of faith to derive from that
intuition the thesis that all accomplices and perpetrators should be
treated alike. Considering the importance of the concepts of personal
liability and causation in criminal law, it is remarkable how little has
94. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
95. Id. at 798.
96. Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (punishment must be tied to accomplice's personal culpability
for harm); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (punishment of death unconstitutional if
harm inflicted was less than death).
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been written on the theoretical basis of modem accomplice liability and
punishment.
Accomplice law "imputes" the perpetrator's act to the accomplice.97
Some scholars, perhaps in an effort to avoid stigmatizing accomplice lia-
bility as a form of vicarious responsibility, defend imputation on a causal
basis. 98 Accomplice law is thereby sanitized. Causation, however, cannot
accurately explain many, if not most, cases of accessorial imputation. 99
The more viable theoretical basis for accomplice liability is found in
the law's requirement of intent by the secondary actor. Professor Kadish
recently hypothesized why a lesser mens rea than intent is insufficient for
accomplice liability:
It may reside in the notion of agreement as the paradigm mode by
which a principal in agency law (the secondary party in the terminol-
ogy of the criminal law) becomes liable for the acts of another person.
[Such liability] ... rests essentially on his consent to be bound by the
97. Even the use of the word "imputation" may be controversial in this vacuum of legal
scholarship. Although the term has been frequently used by courts, see, e.g., State v. Hayes,
105 Mo. 76, 81, 16 S.W. 514, 515 (1891), and by commentators, Robinson, supra note 2, at
631-39, Professor Kadish does not use it. He posits that the acts of the primary party "are his
acts and his alone." Kadish, supra note 2, at 337. The secondary actor incurs legal responsibil-
ity for those acts because of her own actions, and the perpetrator's actions are not imputed to
her. Id.
98. "Vicarious responsibility" generally is applied in civil respondeat superior situations,
in which the master is held responsible for the actions of his servant, even though the former is
morally innocent and did not cause the injury. G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 647-48; Kadish;
supra note 2, at 337. The concept of vicarious liability, however, is "repugnant to every in-
stinct of the criminal jurist." Sayre, supra note 2, at 702. Technically, however, the term is
value-neutral, merely expressing the conclusion that one is to be held accountable for the acts
of another. G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 647.
Whatever their motives, a few scholars attempt to explain accomplice liability on causal
grounds. Professor Sayre writes that criminal liability is "exclusively dependent upon causa-
tion." Sayre, supra note 2, at 702. He reasons, however, that causation may be proved either
"by authorization, procurement, incitation or moral encouragement, or . . . by knowledge
plus acquiescence." Id Causation frequently is not proven under such circumstances. See
supra notes 37, 52-64 & accompanying text. Even Sayre elsewhere speaks of the accomplice as
a "contributing cause." Sayre, supra note 2, at 707. This may indicate his awareness that true
causation is not always involved.
A more recent article also treats accomplice liability in causal terms. Robinson, supra
note 2, at 631-39. Professor Robinson is slightly more cautious, however. He concedes that
the "strength of the causal relation varies," and that sometimes the "causal connection to the
harm is tenuous at best." Id. at 632, 635, 638.
Other scholars, however, concede the frequent absence of a causal connection. See, e.g.,
G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 680 ("that one can contribute to a result without causing it lies
at the foundation of accessorial liability"); G. WILLIAMS, THE GENERAL PART, supra note 7,
at 381-83 (conceding, in cases of aiding by encouragement, that the theory of liability appears
to be authorization, not psychological causation); Kadish, supra note 2, at 357.
99. See supra notes 52-64, infra notes 174-76 & accompanying text.
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actions of his agent, whom he vests with authority for this purpose
[B]y intentionally acting to further the criminal actions of an-
other, the secondary party voluntarily identifies himself with the prin-
cipal party. . .. 100
Thus, in effect, the accomplice authorizes the primary actor's conduct. 1o
She accepts it as her own. 10 2 It follows, therefore, that "[s]he who ad-
vises or commands an unlawful thing to be done shall be adjudged acces-
sory to all that follows from that same thing, but not from any other
distinct thing" that she has not authorized by advice or command.103
Civil rules of agency, however, cannot explain precisely the doc-
trines of criminal law accountability. 04 Civil agency requires a party to
consent to being subjected to the control of another,1 0 5 whereas criminal
liability does not. 106 A criminal accomplice is responsible for the acts of
another even if under civil theory the latter would be classified as an
independent contractor who is not under the accessory's direct control or
supervision. 107 Moreover, civil, but not criminal, 0 8 liability can be pred-
100. Kadish, supra note 2, at 354.
101. See also G. WILLIAMS, THE GENERAL PART, supra note 7, at 381-83 (rationale for
holding accomplice liable).
102. The language of courts on this point is clearer in the analogous case of conspiracy.
See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946) ("And so long as the partnership
in crime continues," each party is responsible for the acts of fellow partners.); Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912) ("Having joined in an unlawful scheme, having constituted
agents for its performance," each party is responsible for the acts of the others.). Although
this Article deals explicitly with accomplice law and not accountability by conspiracy theory,
everything said applies at least as compellingly to conspiratorial relationships. See supra note
1 & accompanying text.
103. Queen v. Saunders & Archer, 2 Plowd. 473, 475, 75 Eng. Rep. 706, 709 (1575) (re-
porter's note) (emphasis added); see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *38.
104. Kadish is aware of the limits of the analogy. Kadish, supra note 2, at 354-55.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
106. By definition, one cannot be a civil agent without somehow choosing to be an agent.
In accomplice law, however, it is possible for the perpetrator to act without even knowing that
there is an accomplice.
107. Especially in cases of conspiracy, the result can be "vicarious criminal responsibility
as broad as, or broader than, the vicarious civil liability of a partner for acts done by a co-
partner in the course of the firm's business." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 651
(1946) (emphasis added) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The frequent lack of real control by the
accomplice over the perpetrator renders the analogy to agency law especially misleading. See
infra notes 132-36 & accompanying text. For considerations of an alternative approach to
accomplice liability that brings the law into closer conformity with agency theory, see infra
note 170 & accompanying text.
108. By ratifying a prior act, a person under the proper circumstances might become an
accessory after the fact. However, accessory after the fact is a separate crime, with its own
separate and lesser punishment. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 496. In any case,
merely ratifying the prior criminal conduct is not the social harm punished. Rather, it is the
obstruction of justice that is prohibited.
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icated not only on expressed or implied authority, but also on apparent
authority or subsequent ratification. 10 9 And although hostile motives of
an agent to his principal presumably will not preclude vicarious civil lia-
bility so long as the agent's conduct was authorized, such antagonism
may well preclude criminal law imputation. 110
Despite these technical distinctions, the concept of agency explains a
great deal about why we feel justified in punishing an accomplice as if she
were the perpetrator. Perhaps, however, our feelings may be described
better in terms of "forfeited personal identity." Ordinarily a person is
held criminally responsible for his own actions. However, when an ac-
complice chooses to become a part of the criminal activity of another, she
says in essence, "your acts are my acts," and forfeits her personal iden-
tity. We euphemistically' may impute the actions of the perpetrator to
the accomplice by "agency" doctrine; in reality, we demand that she who
chooses to aid in a crime forfeits her right to be treated as an individual.
Thus, moral distinctions between parties are rendered irrelevant. We
pretend the accomplice is no more than an incorporeal shadow.
Questioning the Rationale
Utilitarian Considerations
Accomplices to crime are apt to be dangerous. Surely, society bene-
fits from deterring persons from participating in the criminal conduct of
others. Punishment of accomplices, then, makes good utilitarian sense.
That, however, is not the issue. The question is whether current rules,
which draw no distinctions between accomplices and perpetrators, or be-
tween types of accomplices or levels of contribution, are utile.
There is no empirical research that directly focuses on the compara-
tive dangerousness of parties to crimes. Statistics pertaining to crime
commission, convictions, and recidivism do not distinguish between per-
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1 (in general), 8 (apparent authority), 82
(ratification) (1957).
110. See State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891) (Actions of feigning perpetrator
cannot be imputed to accomplice, partially because the designs and motives of the parties were
not only distinct, but dissimilar or even antagonistic.).
11. Agency doctrine, with its attendant acceptance of vicarious liability, is justified on the
grounds that the principal, the "accomplice" in criminal law, has control over the agent, the
"perpetrator." In accomplice law, however, this is not necessarily so. See supra note 107 &
accompanying text. In conspiracy law, such control may be even more remote and fictional.
Professor Fletcher wrote that this is "another instance in which Anglo-American tort law
reflects greater sensitivity to individual justice than does criminal law." G. FLETCHER, supra
note 2, at 663. This is why the author believes it is more appropriate to call what is going on
by what it is: a theory of moral forfeiture. So understood, the criminal law cannot disguise the
rules in a cloak of civil respectability.
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petrators and their assistants, or between types of accomplices. No social
scientist appears to have considered comparative dangerousness and its
theoretical ramifications. Consequently, we cannot conclude with any
reasonable degree of confidence that accomplices as a group differ in dan-
gerousness from primary parties, or that certain classes of accomplices
might be less dangerous or more easily deterrable than others. Put sim-
ply, there is no hard data to justify any specific conception of accomplice
liability doctrine, even that recommended by this Article."i
2
Nonetheless, some observations may be made by examining one type
of multi-party crime unit that has been the subject of empirical research:
the juvenile gang. Studies show that often the existence and character of
the juvenile gang is the product of a single leader. 1 3 That leader is likely
to be the most effective criminal, the best organizer and planner of crimi-
nal behavior, 114 and a talented manipulator of other youths. 1 5 Fre-
quently, the leader is a sociopath. 1' 6 In many gangs, the single leader
provides the primary cohesive force for the group.117 The gang does
whatever this one person wants.' 18 Other gangs follow a traditional mili-
tary chain of command, in which strength comes from the top and works
its way down, forming different levels of power. Occasionally, power is
found in a small group within the gang.' 1 9
Nonleader members of gangs often join in order to improve their
social status, to establish a sense of belonging, or to increase their self-
esteem. 120 Other members, however, are only marginal participants who
do not seek their personal identity in the gang. 12 Some gang members
112. See infra notes 171-94 & accompanying text.
113. See L. YABLONSKY, THE VIOLENT GANG (1962); 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1671-79 (S. Kadish ed. 1983).
114. L. YABLONSKY, supra note 113, at 151.
115. Id. at 155.
116. Id. at 156.
117. Id. at 155; 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 113, at 1671.
118. See M. WOLFGANG, L. SAVITZ & N. JOHNSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 162 (1970) (Describing study of H. BLOCH & A. NEIDERHOFFER, THE GANG:
A STUDY IN ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR 198-201 (1958), in which the leader of "The Pirates"
had "the final say in all important decisions [and was] the mastermind behind some of the
gang's most impressive coups.").
119. M. WOLFGANG, L. SAVITZ & N. JOHNSON, supra note 118, at 162; L. YABLONSKY,
supra note 113, at 151-55 (distinguishing between delinquent and violent gangs, with some-
what different group structures).
120. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH,
REPORT ON JUVENILE GANGS 67 (1979); Reckless, Dinitz & Kay, The Self Component in
Potential Delinquency and Potential Non-Delinquency, 22 A. Soc. REV. 566 (1957); Reckless,
Dinitz & Murray, The Self-Concept as an Insulator Against Delinquency, 21 A. Soc. REV. 744
(1956).
121. L. YABLONSKY, supra note 113, at 151-52. Some such members know only a few
[Vol. 37THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
have been forced to join the group. 122
Adult multi-party criminal groups generally have different charac-
teristics. Adult parties to crime usually commit their crimes and then
separate. 123 When there is an ongoing relationship among the parties,
one rarely finds the accomplices focused on a single, charismatic
leader. 124 Nonetheless, the sociology of gang crime is mildly analogous
to multi-party crime generally, justifying a few cautious observations.
If accomplice liability is justified on theories of specific deterrence or
rehabilitation, then traditional accomplice law is too simplistic. Not all
accomplices should be treated alike. The core leader of crimes is proba-
bly more dangerous and less easily deterrable than other accomplices or
even other perpetrators. Such instigators of crime may require greater
punishment than other criminals. Other accomplices, however, are less
resolute than the leader in their criminal activities, and might need less
punishment. 125 Still other secondary parties become accomplices rather
than perpetrators as the result of fortuity, 126 as a cynical desire to hide
their involvement, or due to rational considerations of expertise in the
criminal activity. Because accomplices are so varied in their type of in-
volvement in group crime, a model based on specific deterrence or reha-
bilitation is unlikely to be generally effective.
The lack of a model for punishment should come as no surprise.
Utilitarian penal theories that focus on the need to incapacitate, intimi-
date, or rehabilitate a wrongdoer favor sentencing procedures that give
judges and parole boards broad discretion in setting punishment accord-
ing to the facts of the particular case. Setting punishment on the grounds
of causation, as this Article ultimately proposes,127 or by treating all par-
ties to crime alike, as does modem law, is overly simplistic under a pure
version of specific deterrence or rehabilitation.
others in the gang, and their closest friends are found outside the organization; other times, the
youth is already violently oriented and finds the gang to be a convenient organization in which
to commit crime.
122. S. ROBISON, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS NATURE AND CONTROL 125 (1960).
123. This is the general understanding of the author; there have been no empirical studies
on this, however.
124. An exception to this general understanding of the author is the Charles Manson case.
See generally V. BUGLIOsI, HELTER SKELTER (1974).
125. This will be especially true if the member was forced to join the gang, see supra note
122 & accompanying text, or if the participant is only a marginal member of the gang, see
supra note 121 & accompanying text, or, perhaps, if the accomplice is a new, not yet hardened,
member.
126. For example, the party may have planned to perpetrate the crime and was about to
do so when someone else committed it.
127. See infra notes 171-73, 229-34 & accompanying text.
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A modified version of these utilitarian theories is possible. If such
an approach were taken, the classes of accomplices would probably more
closely resemble those recommended in this Article than does the uni-
form treatment of accomplices under current law. 128 For example, it
would be plausible to draw a line between the masterminds of crimes and
all other accomplices. The former reasonably may be considered more
dangerous than other secondary parties and, consequently, more in need
of incapacitation.
General deterrence theories also favor differential treatment of par-
ties to crime. If a person is sufficiently undeterred that he is going to
commit crime, it is preferable that the actor choose a lesser rather than a
more serious crime. 129 It would seem to follow, then, that as between
perpetration and assistance, the system of punishment should convince
the rational criminal to serve in a secondary rather than a primary role.
If fully successful, such a system would result in willing accomplices, but
no perpetrators. 130 People might be willing to furnish or point a gun, but
not to fire it. Concepts of general utility, then, disfavor the modern ap-
proach to accomplice law and might support per se mitigated punish-
ment of accomplices.
Another plausible general deterrent approach would use different
degrees of guilt, and consequently differential punishment, to pressure
criminal actors away from perpetration of, or substantial participation in,
crime, and towards only minor, nonessential assistance. As a result, par-
ties might avoid soliciting crime, masterminding planned criminal activ-
ity, or otherwise providing assistance that is likely to be necessary to the
commission of crime, such as providing special expertise to the crime. 131
Nonutilitarian Moral Considerations
If agency or personal identity forfeiture rules do not withstand utili-
tarian analysis, are such concepts otherwise morally appropriate? Of
course, liability can be defended based on such concepts. After all, civil
128. For this author's proposal, see infra notes 171-73 & accompanying text. Regarding
their utilitarian impact generally, see infra note 189 & accompanying text. To consider how
the test would work as applied, see infra notes 197-207 & accompanying text. For an alterna-
tive test that would particularly single out the masterminds of crime, see infra note 170 &
accompanying text.
129. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION, reprinted in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 845 (E. Burtt ed.
1939).
130. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *39-40.
131. As will be seen, this deterrent approach to accomplice liability would approximate
the results that follow from the moral theories espoused in this Article. See infra notes 171-73
& accompanying text.
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law applies agency doctrine, and the common law of crimes applies con-
cepts of forfeiture in other contexts. The question is whether such doc-
trines are appropriate for accomplice law.
The history of agency doctrine in the civil context illustrates its defi-
ciencies when applied to criminal law. Originally developed to account
for the conduct of slaves, contractually hired servants, and appren-
tices,132 agency law focused on the perceived practical economic necessi-
ties of its time.133 Holmes has described the doctrine as peculiar,
anomalous, and limited to its historical context.134 Nevertheless, the
doctrine has been extended to criminal law. The degree of control a prin-
cipal had over his slaves, servants, or apprentices is rarely as great as the
control of the perpetrator over his accomplice in the criminal law con-
text.135 More fundamentally, criminal law is based on moral blame,
stigma, and punishment rather than on business and financial con-
siderations.
Whatever the rationale for applying agency doctrine to the foreign
realm of criminal law, it surely is not one of practical necessity. Nobody
suggests that without the doctrine accomplices would go unpunished.
Frequently the accomplice is punishable for the crime of conspiracy, and
the accomplice should always be punishable, although in some cases per-
haps less stringently, for assisting in crime under nonagency doctrines.136
Nor is accomplice law necessarily more defensible under the doc-
trine of forfeited personal identity. "Forfeiture" is the involuntary or
unknowing loss of a right or privilege.137 The doctrine also permits a
person, perhaps unknowingly, to lose options that are more favorable to
his own interests.' 38 It is largely invoked against moral wrongdoers.
The wrongdoing is thought to justify the loss of the right or privilege, or
to justify the willingness of society to stand by and watch someone igno-
rantly hurt himself. Forfeiture probably explains why persons who
132. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *411-14.
133. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 222 (2d ed. 1937); see O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 232 (1881).
134. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 133, at 231.
135. The case of control may be particularly fictional in making conspirators responsible
under the Pinkerton doctrine. See supra notes 1, 107 & accompanying text.
136. Indeed, the proposals for change made in this Article call for equal punishment in
many cases. See infra notes 171-73, 229-34 & accompanying text.
137. See generally Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitu-
tional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1223, 1234-35 (1977) (state may
treat a guilty plea as a forfeiture of defenses relating to factual guilt).
138. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEo.
L.L 1075, 1112-13 (1979).
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flee 139 or act obstreperously in the courtroom"4° may lose their right of
personal presence at a criminal trial. It also explains why those who
plead guilty may lose the opportunity to litigate antecedent constitutional
violations. 14 1 In the substantive criminal law, forfeiture most likely ex-
plains why the common law permits police to kill fleeing felons 142 and
possibly why it allows innocent persons to kill aggressors in self-de-
fense.143 The felon's or aggressor's right to life is forfeited as a result of
wrongdoing.
The problem with forfeiture is that, unless the concept of propor-
tionality is engrafted onto it, the only inevitable limit to the doctrine is
the scope of the right forfeited. Regardless of the degree, wrongdoing
can result in the loss of the entire right in question. Forfeiture permits
society to ignore the potentially numerous levels of personal culpability
and personal involvement of wrongdoers. Yet, it is precisely because the
criminal justice system stigmatizes the guilty and metes out punishment
for wrongdoing that the common law usually rejects forfeiture, and in-
stead evaluates legal guilt and apportions punishment based on the de-
gree of personal responsibility. Punishment is rendered proportionally to
culpability because this approach is considered deontologically cor-
rect. 144 Rejection of the forfeiture doctrine makes it less likely that
criminals will be treated inhumanely, or that rights perceived as funda-
139. United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.) (defendant's flight prior to trial
results in loss of right to presence at trial), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); see FED. R.
CRIM. P. 43.
140. E.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
141. E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970).
142. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1011 n.7 (1976); see Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S.
Ct. 1694, 1702 n.ll (1985).
143. E. TORREY, THE ROOTS OF TREASON 221 (1984) ("'You might as well realize that
there is a point in all controversy beyond which a man's life (his last card) is necessarily forfeit.
A man accepts that and goes on with his eyes open.'" (quoting William C. Williams)); Ash-
worth, Self-Defence and the Right to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282, 283 (1975); Feinberg,
Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93, 111 (1978).
See generally Deigh, On the Right to be Punished: Some Doubts, 94 ETHICS 191, 204-05 (1984)
(Not all conduct warrants the forfeiture of human rights, as sometimes the social relationship
between the wrongdoer and society is not harmed.); Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 42, 45 (1979) (Wrongdoer's rights can only be deprived to the extent he
deprived victim of his rights.). For other theories to explain self-defense, see Fletcher, Propor-
tionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L.
REV. 367 (1973); Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 871 (1976).
144. Deontology is a moral form of reasoning that focuses on actions as ends in themselves
regardless of their ultimate effect on others. Under this mode of reasoning, conduct is right
and the state of affairs is benefited when persons act in conformity with certain moral impera-
tives. Utilitarian concerns are irrelevant. See J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:
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mental will be denied. 145
The Constitution also prohibits infliction of the death penalty on the
basis of any doctrine that loses sight of the human rights of the murderer
or other wrongdoer. 146 Even if concern for federalism makes the Court
less willing to intervene in the determination of less onerous penalties,
the moral arguments are not rendered any less persuasive.
Accomplice law, however, diverges from pure forfeiture doctrine.
In a pure forfeiture system, one who voluntarily offers to aid in crime
would forfeit her personal identity, even if the perpetrator did not accept
the aid. It is not the aid, but the willed decision to assist or to join the
enterprise that requires forfeiture or the application of agency responsi-
bility. Yet the law traditionally requires that the secondary party render
actual assistance to an actual crime.1 47 Furthermore, contrary to our
law, 148 a pure forfeiture system would justify punishment of those who
ratify prior criminal acts.
Why does accomplice law stop short of following forfeiture doctrine
to its logical conclusion? Is it merely that the reasoning is not adequately
developed, or is it because pure forfeiture in the criminal law context is
repulsive to our moral sensibilities? 149 The law's reticence to require a
FOR AND AGAINST 87 (1973); Munzer, Persons and Consequences: Observations on Fried's
Right and Wrong, 77 MICH. L. REv. 421, 421 (1979).
145. See Fried, Distributive Justice, 1 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 45, 51 (1983) ("To proclaim
indifference in the fact of misery is to devalue in others what gives us moral worth .... lIt] is
not to value that which gives us value to ourselves .... [It] is to devalue our own moral
worth."). See also Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 MONIsr 550 (1968), that states:
[To say [a person]. . . can forfeit this right [to life] is to say. . . that he ceases to be
a person, and so can justifiably be killed or left to die because now (on account of
what he has done) he no longer merits our consideration, any more than an insect or
stone does. Surely, one of the purposes of the notion of natural or human rights must
be to discourage, indeed prevent, us from ever thinking about anyone in this way.
Id. at 570 (emphasis in original).
146. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ([T]here is a "need for treating each
defendant in a capital case with the degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual
... "); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (concluding that even a repeated rapist is
entitled not to be killed by the state). For a general review of the constitutional principles
applicable to the issues in this Article, see supra notes 85-96 & accompanying text. For the
implications of the author's theories on the constitutionality of the execution of accomplices to
murder, see infra notes 208-28 & accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 27-29 & accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 108-09 & accompanying text.
149. Forfeiture concepts, to the extent that they may explain the justification of homicidal
self-defense, see supra note 143 & accompanying text, are also not followed to their logical
extent in that field either. Logically, if an aggressor forfeits his right to life, there is no reason
why an innocent person should be required to retreat, or why the innocent person should be
required to use less extreme measures when they are available. Yet, this is the law. Presuma-
bly, this is because we are troubled by some implications of forfeiture doctrine.
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complete forfeiture of personal identity is a stark reminder that there is
something troubling about guilt or punishment insufficently tied to per-
sonal causation. Once we admit that we apply an impure version of the
forfeiture doctrine, it is harder still to argue that we must cling to the
remainder of the conceptual system.
If accomplice liability is premised upon the morally questionable
foundation of forfeiture, its justification is not saved by commonly shared
moral intuitions. Most of us probably would agree that those who par-
ticipate, or even try to participate, in crime should be punished. Some go
further and argue that accomplices and perpetrators are morally
equal.1 50 Historically, however, our accomplice rules were developed in
order to save the secondary party from execution.1 51 Juries traditionally
treat accomplices more leniently in the death penalty context, 152 and
prosecutors often exercise their discretion to favor accomplices.1 53 Sub-
stantively, too, differential moral blameworthiness explains the willing-
ness of some courts to allow the defense of duress in homicide
prosecutions for accomplices, but not for perpetrators.1 54 Moreover,
although modem Anglo-American law rejects such distinctions, differen-
tial treatment of parties to crime is built into the legal systems of some
European nations.1 55
It seems, then, that moral intuition suggests that not all accomplices
are alike, and that their categorical treatment as if they are perpetrators
is not necessarily fair. Intuitively, of course categorical mitigation of
guilt and punishment of all accomplices is also difficult to defend. 156 Le-
niency toward accomplices causally tied to the wrongdoing, or actually
150. Modem criminal law hombooks hardly promote serious thought about this subject.
Professors LaFave and Scott simply state that principals in the first and second degree, and
accomplices before the fact, are "properly subject to the same punishment," and that the mod-
em approach is to abrogate all distinctions. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 495.
Professors Perkins and Boyce do offer some thoughts on the subject, but only focus on the
"social menace" of the "brains" behind a crime, comparing that person to the "terrified under-
lings" who perpetrate the crime, and concluding that their guilt "is certainly no greater than
[that of the 'brains']." R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 764. The authors do not
confront the comparative moral guilt of other accomplices and perpetrators.
151. See supra note 19 & accompanying text.
152. Dressier, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 76, at 64-72.
153. See supra note 26.
154. Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, 126 Pa. 54, 72, 17 A. 520, 521 (1889); Regina v. Paquette,
1977 S.C.R. 189 (Can.); Director of Pub. Prosecutions for N. Ireland v. Lynch, 1975 A.C. 653.
155. G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 640, 644, 650. For discussion of the German and
Soviet approach, see infra note 170 & accompanying text.
156. Professor Fletcher provides an excellent discussion of the possible ways that categori-
cal mitigation might be defended and discusses the problems with each such theory. See G.
FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 649-57.
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in control of the events that transpire, seems counter-intuitive. 1 57 None-
theless, if our intuitions do not justify treating all accomplices as deserv-
ing of less punishment than all perpetrators, it is probable that most of us
believe that it is morally significant whether someone commits the moral
wrong himself or only aids in its commission. The metaphorical, if not
actual, blood of the victim is on the hands of the primary party more
than on the hands of his secondary assistant. The taint is greater on most
perpetrators than on most accomplices, especially when the accomplice's
deeds are trivial or peripheral to the main events. 158
Yet, forfeiture and agency doctrines conceptually preclude giving
explicit legal status to these moral intuitions. We are forced either to
treat alike those about whom we have dissimilar feelings, or to avoid the
explicit dictates of the law in a comparatively invisible fashion by inviting
wide-ranging prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, and jury nullifica-
tion.159 Under the prosecutorial approach, not only must we trust the
executive branch to enforce moral values not evident in the legislative
code, but we give the prosecutor the opportunity, if not the incentive, to
conduct abusive prosecution of peripheral accomplices as if they were
perpetrators. 1e
Finally, most state penal systems treat what appear to be morally
157. Taken literally, such an approach might require a jurisdiction to defend treating more
leniently the person who does not commit the physical acts, but who uses another as her
innocent instrumentality. For discussion of the innocent instrumentality doctrine, see supra
note 12.
158. For examples of such trivial assistance, see supra notes 55-63 & accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 26, 153 & accompanying text.
160. Why was Herbert William Wilcox prosecuted for being an accomplice of saxophonist
Coleman Hawkins, who violated the British law against aliens by accepting employment in
England? See Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464. Wilcox ran a periodical, Jazz Illus-
trated, which published a positive review of the Hawkins concert, and Wilcox was among
those who met Hawkins at the airport. We also know Wilcox applauded at the concert, be-
cause the court made a point of this fact. However, there was no evidence that Wilcox was
instrumental in any way in Hawkins' decision to come to England, or in Hawkins' ability to
obtain the concert date. Although Hawkins was somewhat more visible (by virtue of his maga-
zine affiliation) than others, many other people, including all the spectators at the concert,
were presumably subject to prosecution. Why were they not prosecuted? Why, on the other
hand, was anyone other than Hawkins prosecuted? It is possible that such selective prosecu-
tion is based on factors that ought not to be a part of the prosecutorial process.
Or, should all the men who allegedly cheered while a woman was raped in a Massachu-
setts tavern have been prosecuted as accomplices? See N.Y. Times, March 11, 1983, at A14,
col. 5. If the answer is yes, should not all the hockey fans who cheer a criminal battery on the
ice be charged along with the batterer? If the answer is "no" to the rape, why not? Why are
those who cheer entitled to more lenient treatment than the law requires? Although there
might be legitimate reasons for prosecuting some, but not all, accomplices, or for treating some
more leniently, prosecutorial discretion not to charge a very minor character may be less a
function of accomplice law than of factors collateral to the guilt or proof.
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similar cases in an inconsistent fashion. The common law and many
states treat inchoate offenders as less serious criminals than their success-
ful partners. 161  This is appropriate under retributive theory.1 62 Yet,
those same jurisdictions punish accomplices who do not cause the ulti-
mate harm as seriously as they punish the perpetrator and those accom-
plices who do cause the harm. If the attempted killer is not punished as
severely as if he were a killer, however, why should the person who tries
to cause harm by assistance, but whose assistance is unnecessary to the
offense, be treated as if she did cause the harm? At least in states that
treat inchoate offenses less seriously than the completed crimes, treating
noncausal accomplices like causal accomplices is morally inconsistent.1 63
None of these arguments, of course, "prove" that basing guilt and
punishment on forfeited personal identity is morally objectionable. Nev-
ertheless, a good case for such a proposition arguably has been made.
We increasingly seem aware of the moral problems with forfeiture doc-
trine in other contexts, such as in self-defense and in the killing of fleeing
felons. We have also seen that the accomplice rules are unnecessary, and
most likely contrary to any valid utilitarian concern. Current rules also
present substantial collateral dangers, especially that of discriminatory
prosecution. They also are internally inconsistent with the way we treat
inchoate criminals in most states. In sum, it should not be considered
radical to suggest different solutions to accomplice liability; rather, the
burden on those who would cling to the current system should be a
heavy one indeed.
New Approaches to Accomplice Liability
General Goals
Developing a new approach to accomplice liability requires the es-
161. See supra notes 43-44 & accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 71-83 & accompanying text.
163. Admittedly, there is a difference. Attempt results in less harm than perpetration
does, so less punishment is warranted. See supra notes 78-83 & accompanying text. With
accomplice liability, however, the full harm to be punished is committed, albeit by the perpe-
trator and not by the accomplice. The question remains, however, as to how to apportion the
punishment for the harm among the possible parties. If the accomplice's conduct did not
cause the ultimate harm-if her own assistance was unnecessary to the result she intended-
then she did not succeed in her venture. Just as the person who tries to kill a corpse is only
guilty of the lesser offense of attempted murder, the person who tries to cause a death to occur
by someone else's conduct, but who does not cause it because it was happening anyway with-
out her participation, should be punished at a lesser level commensurate with the harm she, in
fact, caused. She is as much entitled to the fortuities of the circumstances as the inchoate
perpetrator. There does not seem to be any principled reason why the inchoate perpetrator,
but not the noncausal accomplice, should benefit from causal fortuities.
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tablishment of specific goals. Initially, the rules of accomplice law
should result in a morally just outcome. Guilt and punishment should
correlate with the actor's degree of moral blameworthiness in order to
maintain consistency with fundamental concepts of the common law of
criminal justice, and the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. This requires integrating the concept of causation more in-
timately with the analysis of accomplice liability. Second, the rules
should be generally consistent with the penal philosophy underlying a
particular state's criminal code. Third, the rules should not conflict with
common sense intuitions, or else they are likely to be ignored or misap-
plied. Fourth, rules that are morally just and socially utile are preferable,
even if the rules are not controlled by utility. Finally, the rules should be
as practical as possible without sacrificing moral consistency. A wholly
impractical but just solution is really no solution at all. On the other
hand, a practical, but morally wrong or incoherent approach, is worse.
The former only alerts us to go "back to the drawing board"; the latter
permits us to continue apathetically down the wrong path.
Three Possible Solutions
This Article has highlighted the current law's simplistic uniform
treatment of all accomplices alike regardless of participation in the crime.
The system could be made more just by replacing agency and forfeiture
doctrines with one of the three tests described below.
Substantial Participation Test
The test most similar to the current system and, therefore, most
likely t6 be acceptable is the substantial participation test. This test
would require drawing a distinction between two classes of accomplices:
"substantial participants" in the offense committed, who would be con-
victed of the same crime and punished to the same degree as the perpe-
trator, and "insubstantial participants," who would be convicted of a
lesser degree of the charged offense, or who would at least be entitled to
categorically lesser punishment for the same offense.
It must be noted that this approach is not conceptually tied to cau-
sation, although its likely effect would be to exclude from the stiffest pun-
ishment some persons who are not causally tied to the ultimate harm.
Because "substantial participants" are defined as those who play a major
or active part in the commisssion of the crime, the most peripheral par-
ticipants, particularly those whose assistance may be little more than psy-
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chological encouragement, 164 would be filtered out. Those accomplices
whose actions are substantial would be fully punishable.
This approach is certainly preferable to current law because it ex-
cludes from full punishment those for whom, according to our clearest
moral intuitions, full punishment is inappropriate. It would also separate
out those least likely to be dangerous. Nonetheless, a number of objec-
tions may be offered to this appproach.
The rule is too subjective for a jury to decide that a participant is a
"'substantial" participant. It is true, of course, that no bright line sepa-
rates the "substantial" participant from the "insubstantial" one. Juries
frequently are required, however, to draw distinctions without any more
guidance than their collective common sense. They must decide whether
ordinary people would become violent from certain provocations; 165 they
must decide if certain conduct is foreseeable or not; and they must decide
if a consequence is "too remote. . . in its occurrence to have a just bear-
ing on the actor's liability or gravity of the offense."' 166 Most would agree
that one whose participation consists of no more than applauding a
wrongful act, of making lunch for the criminal, or of giving the criminal
dry clothing before he goes to commit a crime, is only an insubstantial
participant in a crime. 167
This approach fails to make the proper moral or utilitarian distinc-
tions for less peripheral parties. This criticism is more significant. The
concern here is that "participation," if not defined in terms of causation,
will still result in morally inappropriate conclusions for precisely the
same reasons the current system is unfair: people are not punished for
their personal connection with the punishable harm, but for their deci-
sion to join the criminal enterprise. In short, forfeiture, with most of the
negative components outlined earlier, remains the guiding principle of
this test.
The substantial participation test only serves to use the forfeiture
doctrine in a slightly more limited fashion. The test still ignores personal
identity when the criminal seems to be so significantly involved in the
crime that we are less uncomfortable with the idea that the person must
164. See supra notes 54-58 & accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 52 Ala. 348, 354 (1875) (Provocation "in the mind of a just
and reasonable man [would] stir resentment to violence endangering life."); Director of Pub.
Prosecutions v. Camplin, 67 Crim. App. 14, 18 (1978); Regina v. Welsh, [1869] 11 Cox. Crim.
Cas. 336, 338 ("[T]here must exist such an amount of provocation as would be excited by the
circumstances in the mind of a reasonable man, and so as to lead the jury to ascribe the act to
the influence of that passion.").
166. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.03(2)(b), (3)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
167. See supra notes 58, 60-61 & accompanying text.
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forfeit her personal identity. The fact is, however, that active participa-
tion might have little to do with causal connection to the harm. Analo-
gizing to a movie, an actor may have little effect on plot development
even though she is on the screen frequently. She is like the fifth wheel
attached to an automobile. On the other hand, many supporting actors,
vital to plot development, are rarely seen on the screen.
Unless we shift our understanding of "participation" to give it a
causal meaning, therefore, this test may foster counter-intuitive results.
A may provide a chemical crucial to the making of an illegal drug. With-
out A, the crime could not occur. YetA may come on the scene for only
a short time, while the manufacturers of the drug, B and C, are con-
stantly on the scene. A probably would be treated, quite properly under
this test, as an insubstantial participant. However, A's personal partici-
pation in a causal sense seems to justify holding her fully responsible for
the results, which could not have occurred without her. In a similar
manner, a jury might view a solicitor of a crime as an insubstantial par-
ticipant because after she solicits the crime, she drops out of the picture.
If such a result seems implausible, it is probably because the "substantial-
ity" of the solicitor's participation is found in the fact that she created a
crime by soliciting it. It is the causal involvement rather than the
amount of time the accomplice is "visible" that troubles us and makes us
feel the participant should be held fully responsible for the harm done.
Surely, such a person is apt to be dangerous, perhaps more dangerous
than anyone else involved. 168
The substantial participation test fails. To the extent that the level
of participation is based on the amount of time a person is a part of the
criminal activity, truly minor characters will be properly filtered out. Be-
yond that, however, it will fail not only in achieving utilitarian goals, but
also in drawing morally correct judgments. The substantial participation
test falters because it, like current law, fails to tie liability to causal par-
ticipation. Trivial participants aside, the test still permits a person to
forfeit her right to be judged and punished according to the degree of
connection to the harm.169
168. If the solicitor is a person who wants a spouse killed, and hires a professional killer to
perform the deed, we would probably consider the perpetrator more dangerous than the solici-
tor. If the solicitor is a Mafia chief, however, who "orders" her underling to liquidate an
enemy, the result would be the opposite.
169. There is precedent for the substantial participation test in the context of the death
penalty. As of 1979, 21 of the states that permit execution of accomplices to murder, treat as a
mitigating circumstance the fact that the defendant was an accomplice and his participation
was "relatively minor." Dressler, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 76, at 47 n.186. In only
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Control or Hegemony Test
The control or hegemony test, which has significant European sup-
port, 170 requires that only those persons who actually control, or who
seek and possess hegemony over, the other actors in the crime be treated
similarly to perpetrators and given full punishment. Anyone else is con-
sidered less guilty or less deserving of punishment. This approach has
the effect of making the law more consistent with the agency justification
of accomplice liability. Not only does the accomplice who controls
others fit more properly the idea of the civil principal, or master, but an
accomplice who controls others is likely to be a necessary cause of the
crime. But for the control or hegemony, the crime would not have oc-
curred. The rule is also preferable to the substantial participation test
because it provides more guidance to the jury. Control over the events is
easier to define than substantial participation.
Although preferable to the status quo, this approach goes too far
because it needlessly excludes from full guilt and punishment others who
our intuitions tell us should be treated as fully punishable actors. One
can easily posit a situation in which a person who lacks control or he-
gemony is nevertheless causally tied to the harm and, not incidentally,
highly dangerous. The "brains" behind a bank robbery, for example,
may not be able to succeed in the criminal venture without hiring a
skilled electrician to turn off the alarm system. Does our moral intuition
reject the notion that the electrician should be held fully responsible for
the harm that ensues? Should it matter that she is not in control of the
other participants or the events? Assuming the requisite mens rea is
present, are not all the essential elements of the crime, even as to the
electrician, present? If they are, why not fully punish the electrician?
From a utilitarian perspective, too, the person willing to use special skills
to commit crimes is especially suitable for punishment.
This second approach, then, while making the agency approach
more plausible and coherent, goes too far in permitting leniency. It ex-
cludes from full punishment too many actors, even as it generally ensures
that those who are fully punished deserve it.
Causation Test
Under this test, accomplices fall into two categories: "causal accom-
plices" and "noncausal accomplices." A causal accomplice is one but for
two states, however, does the "relatively minor" participation require that leniency be afforded
to the accomplice. Id. at 47.
170. G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 655-56.
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whose acts of assistance the social harm would not have occurred when it
did.171 In effect, the causal accomplice is held accountable for her own
crime and not for another's. She is a co-perpetrator because all of the
essential elements of the crime-a voluntary act, the requisite mens rea,
the social harm, and the causal connection172-are provable directly
against her. Consequently, full punishment is justified.
The noncausal accomplice, on the other hand, renders unnecessary
assistance. The social harm would have occurred when it did even with-
out the accomplice's participation. The noncausal accomplice would not
be held accountable for the criminal acts of the perpetrator. Because the
test is not founded on either agency or forfeiture doctrine, the noncausal
accomplice would be accountable only for the harm actually caused.
Like inchoate harm, a noncausal accomplice's harm is difficult to
define. Surely, there is something wrongful and dangerous, whether or
not particular harm ensues, in joining others' efforts to cause that harm.
Just as the perpetrator who attempts to commit a crime is punished for
the unsuccessful effort, the noncausal accomplice deserves to be punished
for attempting to assist others to cause harm that would occur even with-
out her assistance. Like the inchoate offenses of conspiracy or attempt,
however, such criminal conduct is less harmful than actually causing the
result.
The causation approach makes persons guilty of the harm they
171. It may be argued that there is no such thing as a "causal" accomplice, because it is
wrong to suggest that any person can be the "cause" of another human being's willed decision
to commit a crime. For a discussion of the reasons why this argument should be rejected, see
infra notes 174-85 & accompanying text.
172. The common law of crimes requires that the perpetrator of a crime not only be an
actual cause of the social harm, but also that he be a proximate or legal cause. See supra note
39 & accompanying text. This Article only focuses on the "actual cause" requirement because
proximate cause concepts would rarely stand in the way of convicting a causal accomplice.
Proximate cause serves as a doctrine to permit acquittal, or conviction of a lesser crime, of a
person who factually causes a social harm when it would be unjust to hold him responsible for
that harm. For example, if an intervening event occurs after the defendant acts, but before the
social harm occurs, making the manner in which the harm occurs unforeseeable or the result
quite different, it may be morally unfair to hold the first actor fully responsible. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
In the case of multi-party crime, however, such an intervening event is unlikely. Either
the crime intended is committed, so there is little reason to cut off guilt, or a crime unintended
is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. In the latter case, under current
accomplice law, the accomplice can be held accountable, although her mens rea is not one of
intent to cause that particular crime. See supra note 30 & accompanying text. This particular
doctrine is heavily criticized. See supra note 36 & accompanying text. The author would
abolish it and only permit guilt for those crimes for which it was the purpose of the individual
to be an accomplice. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Thus, a finding of not guilty would be required, not because of any lack of proximate cause,
but because of insufficient mens rea.
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cause, not for the harm others cause. 173 The same result can be reached
by the conceptually less pure approach of holding the noncausal accom-
plice, like the causal one, accountable for the perpetrator's crime, while
categorically mitigating the punishment of the noncausal accomplice.
There are several possible objections to the causation test. By defini-
tion, causation never exists in cases of accomplice law. This claim was
recently advanced by Professor Kadish. 174 If true, it renders meaningless
the suggestions for reform based on causation. Kadish relies heavily on
the causation analysis of Hart and Honor6, who contend that a volun-
tary, willed act renders any previous action, human or otherwise, caus-
ally irrelevant to the ensuing results. 175 Thus, when A offers a large sum
of money to P to kill V, the decision by P to accept the offered money
represents the sole cause of V's death. We cannot say, under this theory,
that but for the offer by A, P would not have killed V. According to
Kadish, "when we seek to determine the responsibility of one person for
the volitional actions of another, the concept of cause is not available to
determine the answer." 176
Kadish explains that this view of causation is based on the criminal
law's notion of moral responsibility. This notion is predicated on the
idea that blame and punishment of an actor are justifiable only if we
concede the existence of the free will of the actor. As Kadish explains it,
this doctrine of free will renders human action fundamentally different
from the unwilled responses of nonhuman forces or the actions of co-
erced humans. 177 Free will makes it impossible to predict how prior con-
ditions will affect that person. "[E]very volitional actor is a wild
173. This approach has an incidental side benefit. Courts have had remarkable difficulty
dealing with the question of whether or not an accomplice may properly be convicted of a
crime involving a mens rea of recklessness or negligence. For example, can it ever be said that
A is an accomplice in the crime of involuntary manslaughter? Is it meaningful to say that A
"intended" to cause a negligent killing? If A intended a negligent killing, then A intended a
killing, and that is murder not manslaughter.
The solution to this basic problem is less than certain. W. LAFAVE & A. Scovrr, supra
note 1, at 505, 510. Most courts probably are willing to convict the accomplice for a negligent
result, even if the accomplice did not intend the result, but only intended to aid in the events
that led to the result. Kadish, supra note 2, at 347.
Many of these cases could have been more easily resolved, however, by viewing the "ac-
complice" as a perpetrator of the reckless or negligent result. See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 184 So.
2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 511-12.
174. Kadish, supra note 2, at 355-61.
175. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORS, supra note 47, at 39, 292.
176. Kadish, supra note 2, at 335.
177. The common law treats the coercing actor as the principal in the first degree, by
application of the "innocent instrumentality" doctrine. See supra note 12 & accompanying
text.
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card."178 Forces of nature, however, are predictable:
Experience teaches us that natural events occur in consequence of
some antecedent events . . . .Barring miracles, so long as we know
the causal laws we can speak with certainty. . . .We can say in every
instance either that the event would not have happened if that condi-
tion were not present, or that it would have occurred even if the condi-
tion were absent. . . . The laws of cause and effect permit no other
conclusion.179
Kadish's points are important. Blame is predicated on free will;
concepts of causation must take into consideration the difference between
human and nonhuman responses to prior conditions. To concede this
point, however, does not render meaningless the reforms recommended
here. Nor, it should be emphasized, does Kadish claim otherwise. He
concedes that causation can be broadly conceived to include human re-
sponses.180 He also concedes that when the chances are remote that a
secondary party's assistance "mattered," traditional accomplice liability
seems excessive. 181 One may choose some term other than "cause" to
identify the appropriate distinctions between parties, but the moral argu-
ments this Article espouses remain pertinent.' 82
Kadish's point primarily demonstrates that proof of causation is
more difficult when human, rather than natural, forces intervene. In
judging accomplices, we really ask whether an accomplice's behavior
"could have contributed to the criminal action of the principal. . .[and
whether] without the influence or aid [of the accessory] it is possible that
the principal would not have acted as he did."' 183
The implication is that conviction is permitted upon a lesser level of
proof of sine qua non connection in view of the unpredictable nature of
human action. Once the issue is seen as one of burden of proof, the de-
bate shifts. It is not that causation is not morally important. We simply
might need to prove it differently or apply a less demanding burden of
proof.
In fact, it is not always harder to prove causation when humans
rather than inanimate forces intervene. For example, it is probably easier
for a jury to conclude that A's paying P a million dollars to kill V was a
178. Kadish, supra note 2, at 360.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 334. Hart and Honor6 criticize the fact that the Model Penal Code does not
accept this categorical rule. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORIf, supra note 47, at 357.
181. Kadish, supra note 2, at 363.
182. Indeed, Kadish in passing concedes that a "separate and lesser punishment classifica-
tion for those whose contribution is less than substantial" would not be contrary to underlying
complicity theory. Id. at 363-64.
183. Id. at 359 (emphasis in original).
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cause of the ensuing murder than it is to say that cigarette smoking killed
a particular cancer victim. 184 That is, it is easier in the first case than in
the second to say that but for the first event, i.e., the million dollar pay-
ment or the cigarette smoking, the second event, i.e., the killing or the
cancer death, would not have occurred when it did. People reach causal
conclusions not only by application of scientific principles that are ex-
plained to them by experts, but also by application of personal human
experience. In the cigarette smoking case, jurors must rely heavily on the
expertise of medical witnesses; in the solicitation situation, however, they
can draw upon their own common sense knowledge about how people
react to certain human stimuli. Admittedly, humans are less predictable
than well-understood scientific forces. Ultimately, however, causation is
a common sense principle that we use to reach judgments about a per-
son's moral and legal responsibility for actions. I85 As long as we are
prepared to allow juries to reach common sense conclusions about causal
responsibility without requiring scientific certainty, we can reaffirm the
importance of causation to accomplice liability. We thereby allow the
law to reach results that come much closer than current law to appor-
tioning guilt and punishment to the degree of personal causal connection
to social harm.
Causal connection is usually nothing more than a fortuity, and it is
morally senseless and socially counter-productive to proportion guilt or
punishment on such a basis. Although fortuity sometimes plays a signifi-
cant role in drawing causal lines, 186 the moral importance of drawing
distinctions based on the formalities of causation has been recognized
consistently in the common-law treatment of perpetrators of harm. 187
184. It may be true, as Kadish asserts, that for physical, but not human, events causal
conclusions are theoretically capable of being ascertainted with certainty. Professor Jerome
Hall has observed, however: "in the light of the progress of psychology, including especially
the increased awareness of the effectiveness of persistent malevolent pressure on human minds,
there is no a priori reason why causation by giving an incentive should not receive wider recog-
nition in the criminal law." J. HALL, supra note 70, at 273.
In any case, the certainty about which Kadish speaks is explicitly predicated on the condi-
tion "so long as we know the [physical] causal laws ...... Kadish, supra note 2, at 360. In
the real world, however, physical laws of causation frequently are as obscure as the human
variety. Practically, the question of causation must ultimately be left to a jury of humans and
to their knowledge and common sense.
185. H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 237 (1979); Note, Causation in the
Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1249, 1260 (1978); see J. FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING 27 (1970) (Legal responsibility "is something to be decided, not simply discov-
ered." (emphasis in original)); G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 594 (Causation "must attend to
the ways [it] functions in our daily lives.").
186. See infra notes 197-207 & accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 38-44, 66-84 & accompanying text.
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Moreover, many states have penal codes that follow the common law on
this matter,""' and statutes that strip causation from accomplice law
would be inconsistent with their general penal philosophy.
The utilitarian criticism, although plausible, also lacks serious sub-
stance. If the implication of the argument is that the suggested approach
is too lenient, it must be remembered that a finding that an actor is a
noncausal accomplice does not result in exoneration, but only in mitiga-
tion of what may be an otherwise rather severe penalty. Indeed, one
general deterrence approach would call for mitigation of punishment of
all accomplices;18 9 under that theory, the causation test does not go far
enough in mitigation. Clearly, current law makes less utilitarian sense
than a legal system that comes reasonably close to assuring that the
greatest punishment is inflicted upon the criminal masterminds and those
who possess necessary specialized skills or instrumentalities.
The causation approach may make philosophical sense, but how is a
jury to decide the degree of influence of the accomplice's conduct? This
"difficulty of proof" problem, similar to that of defining substantial par-
ticipants, exists for many aspects of criminal litigation. How do we
know, for example, that D intended to kill, and not just to scare, his
victim when he pointed a gun at him and pulled the trigger? Yet, the
government is required to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt' 90
and to a moral certainty. 191 When D fires a gun into the body of a person
wounded by another, 92 the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that D believed the "corpse" was alive and that the victim was
alive when D fired the gun. 193 Even in the accomplice area, the govern-
188. See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 129-30 & accompanying text.
190. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (government has burden of persua-
sion regarding all elements of an offense).
191. "Reasonable doubt is. . . not a mere possible doubt. . . . It is [a doubt such that]
the jurors . . . cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge." CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUcTIONS Criminal § 2.90 (4th ed. 1979).
192. E.g., People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725, 363 N.E.2d 1155, 395 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1977).
For a fascinating account of this perplexing case, see A. DERSHOWrrZ, THE BEST DEFENSE
85-116 (1982).
193. Causation, too, may present serious problems of proof in nonaccomplice circum-
stances. The prosecutor must convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the
defendant's actions caused the social harm, but that the social harm was caused by the wrong-
ful, not lawful, act of the defendant. For example, in a manslaughter prosecution D non-
negligently struck V with D's automobile, but then negligently drove a substantial distance
without checking to see what he felt he had hit, dragging V's body with him. A coroner could
not tell to any reasonable degree of certainty whether V died as a result of the initial non-
negligent impact (in which case D was guilty of no crime) or of the negligent act of driving
without stopping. D's conviction had to be overturned. State v. Rose, 112 R.I. 402, 311 A.2d
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ment is already required to prove the difficult point that an accomplice's
"encouragement" did in fact assist the perpetrator.194
Admittedly, causation will not always be easy to prove in the ac-
complice context. In most cases, however, the facts should make an-
swers rather predictable. In others, common sense should prevail. 95
Lest it be forgotten, if the proposed reforms result in a jury finding of
noncausation, the outcome is not acquittal, but less severe punishment.
Finally, if the practical problems of proof ultimately seem too severe, a
state might shift the burden of persuasion regarding causation to accom-
plices, requiring them to prove that their assistance was not causally
necessary. 196
The Causation Test Applied
The question for the trier of fact is simple to state, if not always easy
to apply. After it is found that a particular defendant acted as an accom-
plice by assisting in the ensuing crime with the requisite intent, the trier
of fact would answer one additional question rather than stopping at that
point: but for the actions that made the defendant an accomplice, would
the criminal harm for which she is being punished have occurred when it
did? 197 This section of the Article applies the test in several fact situa-
tions, and then addresses the consequences of the causation analysis in
the context of the death penalty.
The Accomplice as an Essential or Nonessential Link
A causal connection is likely to be found when an accomplice solic-
its a crime' 98 or provides an essential and not commonly available service
or instrumentality to the crime. The accomplice may provide a chemical
ingredient, not easily obtainable, that is necessary to the production of an
illegal narcotic. The facts may demonstrate that, but for the intervention
281 (1973). There is nothing inherently more complicated about causation analysis in the ac-
complice situation than in cases involving perpetrators.
194. See supra notes 27, 53-63 & accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 198-99, 204-07 & accompanying text.
196. For further discussion of this possibility, see infra notes 232-34 & accompanying text.
197. It may be desirable to include a proximate cause, not simply sine qua non cause,
question for the jury to consider. However, it is very unlikely that a proximate cause limita-
tion would affect any but the rarest cases. See supra notes 40, 172 & accompanying text.
198. However, in rare cases, a solicitor might not be found to be the cause of all the ensu-
ing harm. One example of such a case is when the would-be solicitor offers to pay for commis-
sion of a crime, but the party solicited already had decided to commit the crime for
independent reasons. State v. King, 104 Iowa 727, 74 N.W. 691 (1898). The solicitor might
not be considered an accomplice of any kind, even at traditional common law, unless it could
be proven that the request served as psychological encouragement to the solicited party.
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of the accomplice, the particular batch of drugs would not have been
manufactured or could not have been manufactured until some later
time. Or the accomplice might be an experienced safecracker, without
whose assistance the perpetrator or the mastermind behind the crime
could not have gone forward at that. time. The accomplice might furnish
a very common instrumentality in a very atypical circumstance. For ex-
ample, P may intend to kill V as V is about to board an airplane that
would take V out of the country. P needs a weapon immediately. A,
with the requisite intent, provides it to P at the airport, just as V is about
to escape unscathed. But for that assistance, V would have boarded the
plane safely. Whatever might have happened to V at some later date is
immaterial. But for the assistance of A, V would not have died when he
did. There is no reason of moral accountability not to hold A fully re-
sponsible, along with P, for the ensuing crime.
There will also be many cases in which a jury can rather easily and
reasonably find a lack of causal connection. Virtually all of the cases of
peripheral assistance discussed earlier,199 which currently result in equal
guilt, probably would fall into this category. Many of these cases involve
assistance premised solely on psychological encouragement. Other cases
involve highly trivial physical assistance.
Conceptually, many of these latter cases are linked to the crime only
in the sense that the accomplice in question provides assistance that
strengthens the links of the chain from the first actor to the final one.
Even if the defendant's contribution to the harm is taken out, there is still
a chain tying together the other parties.
The Alternative Causal Link
Another class of cases, however, may present serious conceptual dif-
ficulty. Suppose the accomplice's link, if removed from the chain of cau-
sation, apparently would preclude a finding that the harm would have
occurred when it did. What if the facts indicate that there was another
person readily available who would have replaced the hypothetical miss-
ing link? We may call such a person a hypothetical alternative cause.
The philosophy of causation in such cases is unclear. Some commenta-
tors suggest that the appropriate causal issue is who caused the crime
that actually occurred, not who would have caused it. Following this
approach, the fact that someone waits in the wings to commit a crime is
causally irrelevant. Even if the crime would have occurred at exactly the
same time as it ultimately did, it would be a different crime because
199. See supra notes 54-63 & accompanying text.
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someone else caused it.2° ° One cannot escape the causal connection,
therefore, by suggesting the presence of a hypothetical alternative cause.
Some scholars apparently disagree with this approach. 20 1 They argue
that sine qua non causation, by definition, is counter-factual because it
attempts to predict what would have happened without a particular con-
tributing factor.20 2
In most cases this philosophical dispute creates no practical legal
difficulty. Ordinarily, one can only speculate about the possible presence
of a hypothetical alternative cause. The defendant-accomplice would
certainly have the burden of production on any such claim, and rarely
will there be a basis for reasonable speculation. Even if such a claim
were possible, it is unlikely in most situations that the evidence could
create a reasonable doubt about the defendant's own causal connection.
Moreover, any evidence of a hypothetical alternative cause would usually
prove only that the crime would have occurred later, not when it did.203
In such a case, the alternative cause is irrelevant.
In a rare situation, however, an alternative cause could be relevant.
Consider again the hypothetical of the killing of V at the airport, 2 4 and
assume that the activities occur at V's house. V is about to leave for the
airport in order to depart the country. Suppose, when P needs the gun to
200. H. GROSS, supra note 185, at 243-44; H.L.A. HART & A. HONORt, supra note 47, at
118-19, 225-26; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 773.
201. Note, supra note 185, at 1278-79 (sine qua non causation in such a case does not exist
"in any straightforward sense"); see also G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 680 (In a slightly
different context, Fletcher believes "common sense" causation is missing as to an accomplice if
it can be shown that the perpetrator was "very likely to kill," despite the assistance of the
accomplice.); H.L.A. HART & A. HONORf, supra note 47, at 119 (conceding that there is no
cause if a broad interpretation of sine qua non is used, although they consider such a result
absurd).
202. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-61 (1973) (criti-
cizing what he describes as the orthodox view of causation, but which he concedes remains the
prevailing view).
203. Even Professors Perkins and Boyce hypothesize a situation in which the alternative
cause could "at almost the same instant" cause the same harm. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 10, at 773. Technically, there is no problem finding causation as long as the harm
does not occur at precisely the same time. Admittedly, however, the precision with which we
apply the words "when it did" in the sine qua non test, see supra notes 40, 46 & accompanying
text, must be subject to common sense interpretation by a jury. If the harm would have oc-
curred a day or even an hour later, it seems fair to say that this is a different crime entirely;
when the harm would have occurred just a second later as the result of an alternative cause,
then it would seem reasonable for a jury to say that this is the same crime. In the latter case,
then, the hypothetical alternative cause does present a practical issue. See J. SMITH & B.
HOGAN, supra note 40, at 274 (requiring more than a de minimis shortening of life in murder
cases in order to prove causation); see also supra note 84 & accompanying text; infra note 206
& accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying note 198.
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kill the imminently departing V, P cries out: "Someone, give me a gun
quickly." Both A and X toss loaded guns to P. Both guns land on a table
next to P. P happens to pick up the gun belonging to A. He could just as
easily have picked up X's weapon.
This turn of events is, of course, extremely unlikely. Nevertheless,
in such a case, it would be plausible to argue that A is not a cause of the
death: but for her act of tossing a gun toward P, V would have died, even
when he did, because P would have used the gun provided by X. We do
not have to speculate here about a hypothetical alternative cause. There
was a provable alternative cause of the death.
How would the causation test work in this case? It is possible to
eliminate these cases from consideration by accepting the dominant phil-
osophical position that rejects alternative causes. This Article remains
largely neutral on this matter. However, it does not seem inappropriate
to permit a jury to hear such evidence in the rare case in which it might
exist. Causation is a matter of common sense. Jurors represent the com-
mon sense of the community. Leaving the matter to the jury, then, does
not seem dangerous or undesirable.20 5
Consider the following more plausible case. P plans to rob Bank X.
P has others working with him in the crime and, for the sake of discus-
sion, assume that they are all causally necessary to the crime. A, how-
ever, wants to go along. The facts would convince a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that the actors would have gone with or without A. A
is a last minute addition to the crime, whose participation is not likely to
matter to the plans already developed. A joins the others at the bank.
The only physical act supporting the decision to treat A as an accomplice
is that A opened the door of Bank X so P that could enter. Is A a cause of
the robbery? But for A's act of opening the door for P, would P have
robbed the bank when he did? We may find A to be a cause by ignoring
the possibility of hypothetical alternative causes or by deciding that the
robbery would have occurred, but at some later time. This should be an
issue for the jury. Common sense suggests that there was an alternative
cause-P would have opened the door himself.206 If so, it does not seem
205. There is strong correlation between the problem of dealing with alternative causes
and the problem of simultaneous sufficient causes. In the latter case, some courts apply a
substantial factor test in place of the sine qua non test. For a discussion of the substantial
factor test and the difficulty with that approach to the problem, see supra notes 45-51 & ac-
companying text.
206. Theoretically, the crime probably would have occurred a few seconds later, given the
extra time it would take P to open the door for himself. Then one could treat A as a causal
accomplice, because but for A's act of opening the door the crime would not have occurred
when it did; it would have occurred a few seconds later. .4 is now a cause of the robbery that
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morally implausible for the jury to view A's assistance as noncausal and
to convict and punish A at a lesser level.20 7
Accomplices to Murder in Death Penalty Jurisdictions
The causation test proposed in this Article is morally defensible, and
logically consistent with most states' laws on inchoate offenses. Nonethe-
less, these reforms are not constitutionally compelled. In states that al-
low for the execution of accomplices to murder, however, the causation
test should be mandated constitutionally.
The Supreme Court's general view regarding the importance of pro-
portional punishment, especially in death penalty cases, was discussed
earlier. 20 8 The Court also has ruled on the execution of accomplices to
murder. Specifically, the death penalty may be inflicted only upon those
accomplices whose personal culpability renders the sentence of death
nonexcessive. The Court in Enmund v. Florida20 9 held that the death
penalty can never2 10 be inflicted upon those persons who do not person-
ally kill, attempt to kill, or intend that killing take place.2 11 The state
must focus on the culpability and personal responsibility of the person to
be executed rather than on the guilt of the partners in crime.212 Imput-
did occur. Common sense and moral intuitions, however, probably would not result in the
jury splitting such thin hairs. It is another thing to say the crime might occur an hour or a day
later. In such cases, it is reasonable to invoke the "when it did" language. See supra notes 40,
46, 203 & accompanying text.
207. It cannot be denied that the causation test will present some additional difficulties for
the prosecutor in those cases involving plausible hypothetical alternative causes. Such
problems, however, are not significantly different from those currently confronting the govern-
ment in other circumstances. See supra notes 190-96 & accompanying text. Nonetheless, we
put the prosecutor to such burdens because we believe that the moral principles outweigh the
practical problems. If these burdens seem too great, the burden of persuasion or causation
could be shifted to the defendant. See infra notes 232-34 & accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 85-95 & accompanying text.
209. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
210. Fivejustices would prohibit such executions as a per se matter. Id. Even the dissent-
ers agree, however, that an alleged accomplice ought to be able to raise her minor level of
involvement as a factor in mitigation of execution. Id. at 827-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 801. There is language in the opinion from which it can be inferred that the
holding is even narrower, to wit, that to be categorically immune from the penalty of death,
the accomplice must also not be present at the scene of the crime; that is, she must be an
accessory before the fact in common law terminology. Id. at 788 (noting that Enmund was not
at the scene, and then concluding that "imposition of the death penalty in these circumstances
is inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments" (emphasis added)); id. at 795
(noting jury reaction when "the defendant did not commit the homicide, was not present when
the killing took place. ... ). The Court's frequent use of words indicating that Enmund
"did not kill, attempt to kill, nor intend to kill" apparently demonstrates that the issue of
presence at the scene is not crucial to the decision. Id. at 787, 793, 796, 797, 801.
212. Id. at 798, 799, 801.
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big another's guilt to the person to be executed is not constitutional.213
In reaching its conclusion, the Court analyzed the national trends in
legislation regarding such executions, as well as statistics on jury sentenc-
ing decisions in such cases. 214 The Court's jurisprudential analysis of the
punishment of accomplices focused on whether the penalty of death
would measurably contribute to any valid penal goal,215 placing greatest
emphasis on the absence of the actor's intent to kill. The Court con-
cluded that there could not be a measurable deterrent effect upon those
who do not intend, or at least contemplate, that life will be taken.
The Court also concluded that the degree of an accomplice's per-
sonal moral guilt must be measured if execution is to be justifiable under
retributive theory. The Court stated that some criminal penalties are un-
constitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing. 216
Because the accomplice in Enmund did not kill the victim, and because
he "had no intention of committing or causing"217 such a death, capital
punishment did "not measurably contribute to the retributive end of en-
suring that the criminal gets his just deserts. '218
The Court's underlying analysis is a bit unclear. Although the
Court expressly focused on the penological bases for executing accom-
plices, 219 it seemed in fact to be applying the entirely separate 220 doctrine
of proportionality. 221 Moreover, the Court's discussion of retribution
reads largely like a proportionality analysis. In fact, had the Court ap-
plied the nonproportionality version of retribution espoused and justified
in its earlier decisions, it might have justified the execution of the accom-
213. Id. at 798.
214. Id. at 789-94.
215. Id. at 798-801.
216. Id. at 800 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). In an effort to
strengthen its case against execution of non-intentional killers, the Court seems to have mis-
used Robinson, which the Court has otherwise interpreted as standing for the proposition that
it is unconstitutional to criminalize diseases, although it is permissible to punish acts, perhaps
even involuntary acts, that are the result of such conditions. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968).
217. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 798.
220. In another case, the Court made it clear that punishment can be excessive either if it
is grossly disproportional or does not measurably contribute to any valid penological goal.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977).
221. The proportionality nature of the decision is evidenced by the Court's citation to
earlier proportionality decisions. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788 (quoting and citing the first pro-
portionality decision, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), and the Coker decision).
The dissenters, too, understood the decision to be largely proportionality based. Enmund, 458
U.S. at 810-26 (Burger, O'Connor, Powell & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
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plice. 222 The case makes the most sense, then, as a proportionality
decision.223
The Court's reasoning, at least in terms of proportionality analysis,
is correct as far as it goes. It constitutes retributively excessive punish-
ment to execute a person who not only failed to pull the trigger, but did
not intend for death to ensue. The logic of the Court's reasoning, how-
ever, should take the Court further. Enmund converges comfortably
with the implications of this Article: it is also unconstitutional to execute
accomplices even if they did intend that a death ensue, if their assistance
did not cause the death to occur.
Execution of accomplices, particularly of the noncausal variety, is
rare.224 The reluctance of juries to authorize executions is supported by
the jurisprudential analysis of the common law of crimes, as developed in
this Article. If Enmund can be interpreted as requiring that death only
be inflicted upon those whose personal responsibility for the murder is
proportional to the ultimate punishment of death,225 the execution of
noncausal accomplices should be declared unconstitutional, regardless of
mens rea.
Although the Court did not focus on this question in Enmund, its
own language regarding proportionality includes the causation ele-
ment.226 More importantly, the Court's reasoning regarding execution of
222. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court perceived retribution as a means
by which people can express moral outrage. This, the Court conceded, is morally "unappeal-
ing to many." Id. at 183. Retribution expresses the revulsion of the public to deal with crimes
so outrageous that it is proper to kill the offender whether or not it is a deterrent. Id. at 183-
84. This view of retribution is one typically described as public vengeance. The theory of
retribution that is a part of the proportionality doctrine, however, uses the theory of just
deserts to protect the killer. It ensures that the personhood of the killer is not violated. See
generally Dressler, Substantive Criminal Law, supra note 76, at 1081-88.
223. Subsequently, the Court has reaffirmed Enmund as a proportionality decision. Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291-92 (1983).
224. See Dressler, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 76, at 64-74.
225. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases in which the sentence of death was
ordered for those who arguably were entitled to the protections of Enmund. E.g., Smith v.
Florida, 424 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1045 (1983); Garcia v. Illinois, 97
Ill. 2d 58, 454 N.E.2d 274 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3555 (1984); Newlon v. Missouri, 627
S.W.2d 606 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 884 (1982).
226. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 791 (In the states under analysis, a defendant may not
be executed solely for "participating in a felony in which a person was killed if the defendant
did not actually cause the victim's death." (emphasis added)); id. at 798 (It is fundamental that
"'causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unin-
tentionally." (emphasis added) (quoting H.L.A. Hart)); id. at 801 ("Putting Enmund to death
to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing
does not .. . contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just
deserts." (emphasis added)).
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murderers is in direct conflict with the agency and forfeiture doctrines
underlying modem day accomplice law.
Any noncausal accomplice sentenced to death, therefore, reasonably
can challenge the constitutionality of the sentence on the grounds that
her assistance was unnecessary to the killing.227 Noncausal accomplices
should also argue that execution, even if it were otherwise permissible,
cannot be justified if the state retains the common-law approach of pun-
ishing inchoate offenses less severely than completed offenses. Federal-
ism is no more appropriate in such cases than it would be if a state
punished lesser included offenses more severely than the greater
offense.228
Even if the statutory language recommended in this Article is not
adopted, therefore, states that permit execution of their intentional killers
and accomplices should exclude noncausal accomplices from such pun-
ishment. Such accomplices may be identified by requiring the sentencing
authority to answer a specific interrogatory at either the guilt or the sen-
tencing stage of the trial: "Did the defendant's conduct cause the killing
of the victim?" A negative answer automatically would preclude execu-
tion, regardless of aggravating or other mitigating circumstances.
Proposed Statutory Language
The statutory recommendations in this Article are appropriate for
all jurisdictions. Jurisdictions that treat inchoate offenses as less serious
than completed offenses cannot easily reject these reforms if they wish to
be consistent in their penological philosophy. Utilitarian jurisdictions
should find these reforms plausible under concepts of general deterrence
and, perhaps, specific deterrence.229
A straightforward, but more radical, approach to accomplice legis-
227. Although their view clearly is not that of the other justices, Justices Brennan and
Marshall, beyond their (and this author's) per se objection to the death penalty, appear to read
Enmund as prohibiting all accomplice executions. See Newlon v. Missouri, 459 U.S. 884, 886
(1982) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting to denial of certiorari). This is an overstatement
of the holding of Enmund. See supra notes 209-13 & accompanying text.
228. In other words, a court need not worry that it is inflicting its own penological theories
on a state legislature. If a state punishes attempts less severely than completed offenses, it is
rejecting utilitarian theories of punishment for the retributive theory of proportioning punish-
ment to the amount of harm for which the actor is personally responsible. See supra notes 71-
83 & accompanying text. At least in the death penalty context, states constitutionally may be
compelled to be consistent in their approaches to punishment.
229. Even states that purport to reject the retributive concepts inherent in the common
law frequently evidence their inherent belief in the retributive goals suggested in this Article.
A state that punishes attempt as severely as it punishes the completed offense will nonetheless
frequently treat the inchoate felon more leniently if the crime carries a very high penalty. See
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lation would treat a noncausal accomplice as guilty of a different, lesser
crime than that of the causal accomplice and perpetrator. Such legisla-
tion should read as follows:
LIABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF ANOTHER
(1) A person is guilty of any offense specified in this Code if, acting
with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense, he causes the harm specified by the offense to be committed by
another.
(2) A person is guilty of the offense of Noncausal Assistance if, acting
with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of
another offense:
(a) he purposely assists, or influences another, in the commission
of other offense; and
(b) the harm specified by such other offense is committed by an-
other; and
(c) his assistance or influence did not cause the harm specified by
the other offense to be committed.
(3) The crime of Noncausal Assistance defined in subsection (2) above
is a necessarily included offense of the other offense for which the per-
son is guilty of noncausal assistance.
(4) The crime of Noncausal Assistance defined in subsection (2) above
shall be punished [at some specified level less than is otherwise speci-
fied for the other offense for which the person is guilty as a noncausal
accomplice]. 230
There are practical, but not insuperable, difficulties with such a
scheme. A person indicted for the completed crime could be convicted
as a noncausal assistant, but not, presumably, vice versa.231 A jurisdic-
supra note 44 & accompanying text. When the punishment is especially great, the implicit
concern for the offender's just punishment surfaces.
Additionally, those states that purport to punish attempt and the completed offense
equally, but which do not accept the Model Penal Code approach of treating as accomplices
those who only attempt to aid, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962), would appear to be acting inconsistently. Mississippi and Wyoming appear to fall
into this category. Compare the states listed, supra note 44, as followers of the Model Penal
Code regarding inchoate offenses with those states listed, supra note 29, as accepting the Model
Penal Code accomplice language on this point. It does not seem unfair to suggest that in the
latter states, especially because the state has decided to be lenient to attempted accomplices,
lesser punishment in capital causes should also be accorded to those who aid, but do not cause,
harm.
230. Under this approach to causal accomplices, it is unnecessary to specify that the actor
solicited, aided, or otherwise assisted in the crime, because one cannot cause harm without
providing something in the form of assistance. Nor is it necessary to require that the causal
actor aid with the "purpose of promoting or facilitating" the offense. Once we concede that
the actor caused the harm, there is no reason why the actor should not be guilty of the offense
if she acts with the mens rea sufficient for direct commission.
231. At common law, variance between the indictment and proof at trial, and between an
accomplice and a principal, was fatal to the state's case. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
1, at 499; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 754. This was not so if there was a
variance regarding whether the defendant was a principal in the first or the second degree. W.
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tion might need to clarify its venue rules so that the person charged with
the crime of Noncausal Assistance could be prosecuted either where the
acts of assistance occurred or where the other offense was committed.
A less complicated, but conceptually less pure, statutory approach
would be to hold all accomplices accountable for the acts of the primary
actor, but to provide for per se mitigated punishment of the noncausal
accessory. Under this approach, a state could avoid procedural difficul-
ties, yet punish the noncausal accessory less severely.
This statute should read as follows:
LIABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF ANOTHER
(1) A person is guilty of any offense specified in this Code if, acting
with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense, he:
(a) personally commits the harm specified by the offense;
(b) causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct; or
(c) is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of
the offense.
(2) A person is an accomplice in the commission of the offense if, with
the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense,
he assists, or influences another in the commission of the offense.
(3) Any person held accountable as an accomplice to the offense, pur-
suant to subsections (1)(c) and (2) above, but whose conduct did not
cause to be committed the harm specified by the offense, shall be pun-
ished [at some specified level less than is otherwise specified for the
offense].
If a jurisdiction is concerned about practical problems with the cau-
sation approach, 232 it could shift to the defendant the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of causation. Because this latter statutory system treats
the distinctions between accomplices as one of punishment for, and not
as elements of, the crime, such a shift would be constitutional. 233 In such
a case, subsection (3) above should be drafted to read as follows:
(3) Any person held accountable as an accomplice to the offense, pur-
suant to subsections (1)(c) and (2) above, shall be punished [at some
LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 1, at 499. To avoid some of the pleading difficulties of the
common law, a prosecutor could charge the defendant in separate counts in the indictment as
a principal and as an accessory. However, the prosecutor could be required to choose his
theory before going to the jury. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 754.
These rules, however, do not appear to be constitutionally compelled. Although it would
violate the defendant's constitutional right to adequate notice to convict a defendant of a
greater crime than that for which he was indicted, it is clearly permissible to convict an actor
of a lesser included offense of the crime for which indictment occurred. See United States v.
Miller, 105 S. Ct. 1811 (1985). Section (3) of the proposed statute would protect the prosecu-
tor who wishes to charge the defendant as a causal accomplice.
232. See supra notes 190-96 & accompanying text.
233. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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specified level less than is otherwise specified for the offense] if he
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his conduct did not
cause to be committed the harm specified by the offense for which he is
held accountable. 2 34
Conclusion
Modern accomplice law is theoretically underdeveloped. Perhaps as
a response to the complexities of the common law, modem penal codes
have opted for simplicity at the expense of justice. It is time to reconsider
the law.
Punishment of accomplices is currently justified euphemistically by
the civil doctrines of agency or, more candidly, by a concept of forfeiture
of personal identity. These doctrines conflict with the morality of and
focus upon individual culpability that underlie the common-law rules of
crimes. Penal systems would be more morally justifiable and more co-
herent if guilt and punishment of accomplices were proportionate to the
degree of participation in the crime, their degree of control or hegemony
over others, or the harm they actually caused.
Of the three suggested changes to accomplice law, the best approach
treats accomplices the same as perpetrators by evaluating the degree of
guilt or punishment on the basis of the harm that the accomplice causes.
The reforms advocated in this Article are appropriate particularly
for jurisdictions that seek to proportion guilt and punishment consist-
ently with common-law retributive concepts. Even in jurisdictions that
emphasize utility over retribution, however, the reforms considered here,
including the causation test, are preferable to the current, indefensible
accomplice law. In any jurisdiction, however, a compelling constitu-
tional argument can be made that the causation test is required before
accomplices to murder are executed.
Reexamination of a well-established doctrine will not always result
in a change in that doctrine. Frequently, reexamination convinces us of
the wisdom, not the weakness, of our prior paths. In the field of accom-
plice law, however, such reconsideration of our rules should result in
reform rather than ratification of the way our penal system treats accom-
plices to crime.
234. The state could apparently place any level of burden upon the defendant. See Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (permitting as constitutional the requirement that a defendant
prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
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